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INTRODUCTION
When an institution is in flux, there are two obvious ways to
examine it. One can attempt to make predictions about its future, or
one can explore the current baseline to set up future analysis of the
impact of change. As discussed below, both the Federal Circuit and
the dynamic that has shaped veterans law in recent decades are in
flux. This Article, while continuing the recent trend of reviewing the
developments in veterans law at the Federal Circuit over the
preceding calendar year,1 takes the latter approach to the bigger
picture. An annual review article is better suited to the second
pursuit and there is little solid information that could be used to
predict where the events of 2011 will take veterans law. Accordingly,
a deeper reflection on the status quo helps set the stage for digesting
the coming changes.
Part I of this Article looks at the “changing voices” in veterans law.
This past year has seen an unusually high number of departures and
arrivals at the Federal Circuit. In addition, constitutional cases filed
in the other federal courts indicate that opinions from other circuits
may soon change the dynamic of veterans law at the Federal Circuit.
Part II of this Article will look at the familiar conversation. That
section builds upon an observation made by Paul R. Gugliuzza in last
year’s review article,2 and suggests that, under the surface of the
Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence, there is a familiar rules-versusstandards debate that may reflect different views about what it means
for the system to be “veteran friendly.” Part III contains a review of
the veterans law cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2011. The
Conclusion provides a few thoughts about what the 2011 veterans law
cases suggest about the analysis set forth in Part II. Finally, the
Addendum continues and expands the statistical look at veterans law
1. See Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans
Benefits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155 (2010); Paul R. Gugliuzza,
Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201 (2011). Although no journal produces an annual
review of veterans law at the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) level, its
recent case law has been explored by Michael Allen. See Michael P. Allen, The Law of
Veterans’ Benefits 2008–2010: Significant Developments, Trends, and a Glimpse Into the
Future, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1 (2011).
2. Gugliuzza, supra note 1.
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at the court, begun by Gugliuzza in last year’s review article.3
I.

CHANGING VOICES
A. Judges

Perhaps the most notable events at the Federal Circuit in 2011
were not opinions, but rather the exceptional amount of turnover
experienced by the court. After years of relative stability, the
composition of the Federal Circuit changed significantly. Three
judges left the bench completely, two assumed senior status, and
three new judges were confirmed, with a fourth nomination
announced to fill the final vacancy.4
1.

Departures
Chief Judge Paul Michel retired on May 30, 2011.5 Judge Michel
had been on the court since 1988,6 the year that Congress passed the
Veterans’ Judicial Review Act7 (VJRA). Judge Michel authored
dozens of veterans law cases, including Hodge v. West,8 which
identified the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) duty “to fully and
sympathetically develop the veteran’s claim to its optimum” based upon the
legislative history of the VJRA,9 and the en banc opinion in Bailey v.
West,10 which held that the time period for appealing to the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) is subject to equitable tolling.11
Together, these two cases have been significant factors in easing the
burden on veterans to understand and strictly comply with the
governing statutes and regulations.
The court also lost two senior members, both of whom were
3. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–63.
4. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is poised for a significant transition
as well. There are currently three nominations, which, if confirmed, would increase
the number of active judges on that court from six to nine. See More News on Judicial
Vacancies,
VETERANS
L.J.,
Winter
2011–12,
at
6,
available
at
http://www.cavcbar.net/Winter_2011-12.pdf (discussing the nomination of Carol
Wong Pietsch); Vacancies on the CAVC Attract National Attention . . . and Some Nominees,
VETERANS L.J., Summer 2011, at 1, available at http://www.cavcbar.net/Summer
2011.pdf (reporting on the nominations of Margaret “Meg” Bartley and Gloria
Wilson Shelton).
5. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges.html (search “Michel”; then follow “Michel, Paul
Redmond” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
6. Id.
7. See Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
8. 155 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
9. Id. at 1362 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988)).
10. 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), overruled by Henderson v. Shinseki,
589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc).
11. Id. at 1368.
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veterans and whose tenure on the court pre-dated the creation of the
CAVC. Judge Daniel M. Friedman, an original member of the
Federal Circuit, passed away on July 6, 2011, after more than twenty
years of service in senior status.12 Judge Friedman authored many
notable opinions, including Donovan v. West,13 which affirmed the
concept of delayed subsuming.14 Judge Glenn Archer passed away
later that same month, on July 27, 2011.15 Judge Archer was
appointed in 1985 and had been serving in senior status from 1997
until his passing.16 Judge Archer’s veterans law opinions included
MacPhee v. Nicholson,17 which held that a medical record by itself
cannot be considered a claim for benefits.18
2.

Transitions
Not only did the court lose these three voices, but two other longserving judges took on a reduced role. A month after Chief Judge
Michel’s retirement, Judge Haldane Robert Mayer assumed senior
status.19 Judge Mayer’s judicial service began in 1987, prior to the
creation of the CAVC.20 Judge Mayer is a graduate of West Point and
was awarded the Bronze Star during his service in Vietnam.21 Until
the appointment of Judge Wallach, his transition left the court
without a combat veteran in an active position. Judge Mayer has
authored dozens of opinions in the area of veterans law, including
Collaro v. West,22 which discussed the jurisdictional effect of a vague
Notice of Disagreement,23 and Barrett v. Principi,24 which extended
equitable tolling to cases of mental or physical incapacity.25
12. See Daniel M. Friedman, Circuit Judge [1916–2011], U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR
FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/daniel-m-friedman-circuitjudge.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
13. 158 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
14. Id. at 1381–83.
15. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges.html (search “Archer”; then follow “Archer,
Glenn Leroy Jr.” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
16. Id.
17. 459 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
18. Id. at 1327–28.
19. See Haldane Robert Mayer, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/haldane-robert-mayer-circuit-judge.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
20. Id.
21. See id. Among the court’s senior judges, Judge S. Jay Plager is a veteran of the
Korean War. See S. Jay Plager, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/s-jay-plager-circuit-judge.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2012).
22. 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23. Id. at 1309–10.
24. 363 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
25. Id. at 1321.
THE
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Just one month later, Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa also assumed senior
status.26 Although his service did not predate the creation of the
CAVC, he had served on the court since 1997.27 Judge Gajarsa’s
veterans law opinions include Schroeder v. West,28 which established
that a claim for a benefit encompasses all possible theories,29 and
National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans
Affairs,30 which upheld VA’s regulations governing the adjudication of
post-traumatic stress disorder claims.31
3.

Arrivals
A trio of new voices filled the void left by these changes.32 First,
Judge Kathleen M. O’Malley was sworn in on December 27, 2010,
after having served as a district court judge in the Northern District of
Ohio for sixteen years.33 Judge O’Malley immediately became the
only former district court judge on the court.34 As a trial judge, she
had been an active teacher and scholar of patent law.35 Judge
O’Malley authored her first precedential veterans law opinion, Roberts
v. Shinseki,36 this past June.
On April 7, 2011, Judge Jimmie V. Reyna was sworn in after a
career practicing in international trade.37 Prior to his appointment,
Judge Reyna had been the president of the Hispanic National Bar
Association and active in a wide variety of Hispanic professional
organizations.38 His first published opinion in veterans law was in
26. See Arthur J. Gajarsa, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/arthur-j-gajarsa-circuit-judge.
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
27. Id.
28. 212 F.3d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
29. Id. at 1271.
30. 330 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
31. Id. at 1350–52.
32. On November 10, 2011, Richard G. Taranto was nominated to fill the final
vacancy on the court. See President Obama Nominates Richard Gary Taranto to Serve on the
US Court of Appeals, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/10/president-obamanominates-richard-gary-taranto-serve-us-court-appeals. He is an intellectual property
specialist and an experienced Supreme Court advocate. Id.
33. See Kathleen M. O’Malley, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/kathleen-m-omalley-circuit-judge.
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012). This
case is discussed below in Part III.E.4.
37. See Jimmie V. Reyna, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/jimmie-v-reyna-circuit-judge.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012).
38. Id.
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January 2012 in National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs,39 a review of a direct rule-making challenge.
Finally, on November 18, 2011, Evan J. Wallach was sworn in as the
newest member of the court.40 Like Judge Reyna, Judge Wallach also
brought an international trade background to the court, having
served on the Court of International Trade for sixteen years.41 Judge
Wallach filled the combat-veteran void left by Judge Mayer, having
also been awarded a Bronze Star during his Army service in
Vietnam.42
Although none of the judges brought any veterans law experience
to the Federal Circuit,43 they all added new perspectives to the court
by way of their backgrounds, which differ from all previous judges on
the court. Of course, it is too soon to determine where these changes
will take the Federal Circuit in the area of veterans law (or in any
other area), but the fact that the composition of the court has not
only changed, but has incorporated backgrounds previously
unknown to the bench, counsels special attention in the near future
to the details of opinions involving the court’s newest members.
B. Other Circuits
In retrospect, it may turn out that the most important veterans law
decision of 2011 was not made by either the Federal Circuit or the
CAVC, but rather by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,44 a divided panel of the Ninth
Circuit held that significant portions of both VA’s health care and
benefits systems violated veterans’ due process rights, and indicated
that the district court may need to appoint a special master to assist in
reforming VA.45 The sprawling opinions in that case span sixty-one
pages in the Federal Reporter; many of the details of the holdings are

39. Nos. 2010-7136, 2010-7139, 2010-7142, 2011-7041, 2012 WL 164436 (Fed. Cir.
Jan. 20, 2012).
40. See Evan J. Wallach, Circuit Judge, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges/evan-j-wallach-circuit-judge.html (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Chief Judge Michel noted in his 2010 State of the Court address that the
court had never had a veterans law practitioner. Chief Judge Paul R. Michel, Judicial
Conference for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, State of the Court
(May 20, 2010), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements/
2010/stateofthecourt10.pdf.
44. 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.
2011).
45. Id. at 868, 878, 887.
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beyond the scope of this Article.46 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc; thus the ultimate fate of the case is
unknown.47 Nonetheless, the panel decision in Veterans for Common
Sense has two key holdings that are worth reviewing, as they may prove
very significant if upheld in substance.
1.

Jurisdiction
First, the Veterans for Common Sense panel held that the district court
had jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s claims that delays within the
VA system were so egregious as to violate due process.48 Prior to the
passage of the VJRA, federal courts entertained constitutional claims
against VA on many occasions.49 However, after the passage of the
VJRA, many courts concluded that remedies for delay in veterans
benefits claims had to be pursued through the CAVC.50 The panel in
Veterans for Common Sense disagreed. In essence, the majority
concluded that granting systemic relief addressing how VA processed
claims did not infringe on the CAVC’s exclusive jurisdiction to review
the outcome of individual decisions.51
If this view of the jurisdiction of the geographic circuits takes
root,52 situations may arise in which the Federal Circuit’s rulings on
veterans law are disputed by other courts of appeals. This possibility
46. Such details are discussed extensively, however, in James D. Ridgway, Equitable
Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional
Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012).
47. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2011),
granting reh’g en banc to 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
48. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 879.
49. See James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135, 213–16 (2011)
(providing examples of due process and fundamental fairness challenges to the
limitation on attorney’s fees); see also Kenneth B. Kramer, Judicial Review of the
Theoretically Non-Reviewable: An Overview of Pre-COVA Court Action on Claims for Veteran
Benefits, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 99 (1990) (discussing constitutional challenges brought
under the right to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and due process).
50. See Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 195 (2010) (holding that the CAVC’s jurisdiction could not be
“circumvent[ed] . . . by creative pleading”); In re Russell, 155 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (concluding that the CAVC has exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to VA’s processing of claims); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967–70
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that, in passing the VJRA, Congress intended to preclude
federal courts of general jurisdiction from considering constitutional claims
pertaining to claims for veterans benefits).
51. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 870–72, 879–84 (addressing the issue as
to VA’s health and benefits appeals systems).
52. It is noteworthy that the bulk of the en banc oral argument in Veterans for
Common Sense was devoted to the jurisdictional issue and whether claims alleging
racial or gender discrimination in benefits decisions could be properly brought
through the CAVC. See Video Recording of Oral Argument, Veterans for Common
Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov
/media/view_video_subpage.php?pk_vid=0000006173 (especially at 35:30).
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is more than just theoretical. For example, gay and lesbian service
members have already filed a constitutional challenge to the federal
statute defining marriage53 for purposes of receiving veterans benefits
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.54 An
appeal of an individual benefits claim raising the same issue is also
pending at the CAVC.55 Therefore, there is already at least one issue
in the pipeline in which the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the substance
of veterans law could eventually conflict with that of a regional
circuit.
An obvious result of such situations is that circuit splits could
emerge on constitutional issues related to the veterans benefits
system, increasing the likelihood that the Supreme Court would
consider such issues. Another potential effect is that the Secretary
could be faced with choosing how to administer the system in the
face of conflicting opinions and may be prompted to engage in a type
of non-acquiescence behavior that has plagued other administrative
systems.56 Accordingly, the jurisdictional decision in Veterans for
Common Sense warrants close observation in the near future.
2.

Delay as a violation of due process
The second major ruling by the Veterans for Common Sense panel was
that the appellant had proven the constitutional violations alleged.
Specifically, the panel held, in part, that the delays involved in the
processing of appeals at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (BVA) level
violated due process.57 Although a full discussion of the remedial
53. 38 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006) (defining a spouse as “a person of the opposite
sex who is a wife or husband”); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.50(a) (2011) (same).
54. Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive and Other Relief, McLaughlin v.
Panetta, No. 11CV11905, 2011 WL 5121135 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011).
55. See James Dao, Denied Veterans Benefits Over Same-Sex Marriage, Ex-Sailor
Challenges Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/
denied-veterans-benefits-over-same-sex-marriage-carmen-cardona-sues.html?pagewant
ed=all (challenging the denial of an increase in disability compensation upon
marriage).
56. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative
Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989) (defining nonacquiescence as “the deliberate
refusal of an administrative agency, exercising adjudicatory authority, to follow
relevant judicial precedent in deciding another matter presenting the same question
of law,” and discussing its practice by the Social Security Administration); see also
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (analyzing the practice of nonacquiescence by the
Social Security Administration and the National Labor Relations Board, among
others).
57. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 884–87 (9th Cir.
2011), reh’g en banc granted, 663 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2011). See generally Michael
Serota & Michelle Singer, Note, Veterans’ Benefits and Due Process, 90 NEB. L. REV. 388
(2011) (arguing in favor of the conclusion reached by the majority in Veterans for
Common Sense).
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issues is beyond the scope of this Article,58 the panel remanded the
case with the suggestion that a special master be appointed to aid in
developing a remedial plan.59
If the case were ultimately remanded for the trial court to use its
equitable powers to reengineer VA’s claims process, then a multitude
of issues for the Federal Circuit may arise. Veterans enjoy a great
many procedural rights, and veterans law is a procedurally intensive
area. If VA were forced to modify its processes at the direction of the
district judge handling Veterans for Common Sense—especially if the
district judge issued orders seeking to “streamline the process”—then
the Federal Circuit could soon face disappointed claimants who
assert that the new procedures imposed by the remedial process in
Veterans for Common Sense denied them procedural rights guaranteed
by statute and regulation. It is too soon to speculate about the
specific conflicts that might arise; however, the prospect of significant
procedural changes being imposed upon VA justifies close attention
by anyone interested in veterans law to the ongoing proceedings in
Veterans for Common Sense.
II. A FAMILIAR CONVERSATION
A. Rules Versus Standards
Regardless of where veterans law is being addressed or which
judges are considering the issues presented, it is likely that familiar
themes will emerge. In last year’s summary article, Gugliuzza asserted
that the rulings of the Federal Circuit “reflect a preference for a
flexible, standards-based approach to deciding veterans claims” over
categorical rules,60 but did not explore this observation further.
Despite this casual introduction, it is an assertion that merits further
consideration.
The rules-versus-standards debate is a classic one of scholarly
analysis61 and has been applied to countless areas of jurisprudence,62
58. For a lengthy discussion of the issues, see Ridgway, supra note 46.
59. Veterans for Common Sense, 644 F.3d at 878, 887.
60. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1221.
61. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557 (1992) (considering both cost of creation by rulemaking/standard-setting
bodies and expense to individuals in determining application to their contemplated
acts); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976) (addressing the rules-versus-standards debate in the context of
individualism versus altruism); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (revisiting the debate
from the law and behavioral sciences perspective); Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards,
and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1287 (2006) (arguing for the
employment of rules over standards to provide citizens with the maximum
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although the debates are far from academic. As Pierre Schlag has
observed, “disputes that pit a rule against a standard are extremely
“Indeed, the battles of legal
common in legal discourse.”63
adversaries (whether they be judges, lawyers, or legal academics) are
often joined so that one side is arguing for a rule while the other is
promoting a standard.”64 Accordingly, it is not surprising that
veterans law would feature such debates.
The essential features of the debate are well defined. Rules draw
sharp lines, whereas standards allow for individualized judgments.65
Rules facilitate delegation within agencies by giving subordinates
clear instructions, whereas standards increase the likelihood of
erroneous and inconsistent decisions by front-line administrators.66
Rules cost more up front to formulate and promulgate, whereas
standards cost more to apply and enforce.67 These features are not in
debate. What is debated is which type of norm should be applied to
any given problem. Gugliuzza’s observation about the Federal
Circuit’s possible preference for standards begs the question of what
can be learned about veterans law and the court’s jurisprudence by
reframing the core veterans law debates in terms of the classic
dilemma.
B. Chevron Versus Gardner
As recently discussed by Linda Jellum, a more explicit debate in
veterans law is one between the deference owed to VA under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.68 and the Brown v.
practicable definiteness in laws regulating their non-litigation conduct); Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (arguing that even if the
rules-versus-standards debates were stereotyped there may be substance to such
arguments about form); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (exploring the way in which the
rules/standards debate divided the Court on constitutional issues); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956–57 (1995) (contrasting guidelines,
principles, and analogies to rules and standards).
62. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Rules vs. Standards in International Environmental
Law, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 275 (2004) (environmental law); Tun-Jen Chiang,
The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (patent law);
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 49 (2007) (antitrust law); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling
Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309 (2007) (jurisdiction
of federal courts); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1275 (2002) (cyberlaw); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore:
Form and the Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65 (2002) (election law).
63. Schlag, supra note 61, at 380.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 384–85.
66. Id. at 386–87.
67. Kaplow, supra note 61, at 562–63.
68. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Gardner69 canon of “veteran friendly” interpretation.70 Jellum has
proposed a spectrum of possibilities for resolving the conflict.71
However, she has not explored why the conflict developed in the first
place.
It is not difficult to reconceive the Chevron-versus-Gardner debate as
a rules-versus-standards conflict. The well-accepted administrative
benefits of bright-line rules naturally pull the Secretary in that
direction. VA has long struggled to keep up with its chronically
increasing load of benefits claims.72 The lay adjudicators on the front
lines may or may not have college degrees,73 and have pushed back
against the burdens of implementing complex regulatory schemes.
For example, the labor union representing VA adjudicators opposed
a proposed regulation on rating traumatic brain injuries as too
complex, arguing that “RO employees who are ‘expected to decide
and evaluate [complex claims], in less than two hours, are generally
not brain surgeons with law degrees.’”74 In addition, the VA system
has also suffered from substantial disparities in outcomes among its
regional offices,75 which it has struggled to rectify.76 Accordingly, it is
natural for VA to address these problems by relying heavily on bright69. 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
70. See Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v.
Gardner’s Presumption That Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans’ Favor with
Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59 (2011) (arguing that courts should construe veterans’
statutes liberally in order to further remedial purposes rather than simply construing
them in the veteran’s favor).
71. Id. at 102–21.
72. See James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later:
Confronting the New Complexities of Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
251, 289–95 (2010) (discussing VA’s strategies over the last two decades for
improving and speeding the processing of claims).
73. See id. at 283–84 n.208 (noting that VA phased out lawyers to avoid raising
adjudicator salaries).
74. See id. at 284 (quoting American Federation of Government Employees,
Comment on Proposed Rule AM75: Schedule for Rating Disabilities; Evaluation of Residuals
of Traumatic Brain Injury 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=VA-2008-VBA-0002-0008.
75. See VA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. REP. NO. 05-00765-137, REVIEW OF STATE
VARIANCES IN VA DISABILITY COMPENSATION PAYMENTS 63 (2005) (comparing average
compensation among twelve states).
76. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-213, FURTHER
EVALUATION OF ONGOING INITIATIVES COULD HELP IDENTIFY EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR
IMPROVING CLAIMS PROCESSING (2010) (recommending that VA assess whether
Expedited Claims Adjudication should be widely implemented and whether its pilot
reorganization of claims processors should be expedited); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-512T, LONG-STANDING CLAIMS PROCESSING
CHALLENGES PERSIST (2007) (emphasizing concerns regarding pendency of claims
adjudication and appeal and accuracy and consistency of decisions); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-749T, CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND
MAJOR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS MAY BE DIFFICULT (2005) (testimony of Cynthia
A. Bascetta, Director, Health Care-Veterans’ Health and Benefits Issues, before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs).
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line rules that promote speedy and consistent decision making on the
front lines. Given that administrative concerns pull the Secretary
strongly in the direction of bright-line rules, it is natural that his
arguments for Chevron deference would routinely consist of ones in
favor of such rules.
The Secretary’s natural tendency to favor rules also makes it
natural for veterans’ representatives to assert fuzzier standards as an
alternative. If a claim were denied by the application of a bright-line
rule, it would often be easier to offer a standard as an alternative than
to show that the Secretary erred in failing to adopt an alternative
bright-line rule. Furthermore, “the rule that interpretive doubt is to
be resolved in the veteran’s favor” articulated in Brown v. Gardner
stems from the general belief that veterans benefits are “to be
liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to
serve their country in its hour of great need.”77 As the hundreds of
thousands of disability benefits claims presented each year reveal an
endless array of factual and procedural circumstances, the flexibility
embodied by standards will often allow for favorable outcomes in a
wider spectrum of cases than could be achieved through a simple
rule.
Of course, many cases will not fit this mold. Sometimes, both or
neither party will be advocating for a bright-line rule. In other cases,
veterans advocates will advocate for a rule after a current
discretionary standard has been applied in an unfavorable way.
Moreover, a tendency by the Federal Circuit does not guarantee the
outcome of any given case. However, the rules-versus-standard prism
may be an effective tool in understanding the Secretary when he
argues for deference to a rule against a standard being asserted by
the claimant.
C. The Multi-Faceted Meaning of “Veteran Friendly”
Although the Chevron-versus-Gardner presentation has some merit,
in many ways it does not accurately explain the core conflict. That
framework sets VA and veterans as antagonists, but they need not be
portrayed that way. Another way to see the rules-versus-standards
debate in veterans law is to view it as a debate over what it means for
the system to be “veteran friendly.” The reality is that the Secretary
has a different perspective on the system than individual claimants
for benefits.78 The perspective of veterans’ advocates is relatively easy
77. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
78. Of course, it is entirely natural for policymakers to have a different
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to see. Veterans before the Federal Circuit routinely argue that a
ruling in their favor is the “veteran friendly” outcome, and those
assertions have an intuitive appeal.79 Understanding the Secretary’s
perspective on what it means to administer the system in a “veteranfriendly” manner, however, requires more exploration.
First, as discussed above, the Secretary must be concerned with the
overall speed of the system. As recognized in the context of Social
Security Disability Insurance benefits, “disability insurance program[s
are] designed to alleviate the immediate and often severe hardships
that result from a wage-earner’s disability. In that context, delays . . .
detract seriously from the effectiveness of the program[s].”80 Long
delays in processing claims “reduce a disabled veteran’s ability to buy
food and clothing and to make mortgage payments, causing
significant psychological stress that can lead to marital and family
difficulties, domestic violence, divorce, and even suicide.”81
Therefore, the Secretary must carefully consider how much
complexity can be added to the decisions that the system has to make
without defeating its fundamental purpose.82 In this regard, rules
that enable timely decisions so that benefits may be disbursed before
veterans’ lives slip into crisis are deemed “veteran friendly.”
Second, the Secretary must also be concerned with the consistency
of the program. Widespread perception that benefits decisions are
not accurate and fair undermines public support for benefits
systems.83 In the past, public perception that the veterans disability
system was being exploited by veterans who were obtaining benefits
perspective than the judicial system. The implications of these different perspectives
have recently been explored by David A. Super, who argued that the legal culture
overestimates the value of additional information and delayed decision making,
while undervaluing prompt and predictable decision making. David A. Super,
Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2011).
79. It would be a mistake, however, to accept blindly that ruling for the veteran
in any given case has an overall effect that is favorable to veterans. Many veterans’
appeals present situations in which ruling in favor of the veteran in one procedural
posture may adversely impact veterans in a different procedural posture. See, e.g.,
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 7–8 (2009) (per curiam) (discussing the veteranunfriendly implications of applying the plain language of the holding in Boggs v.
Peake, 520 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), to situations outside the fact pattern in that
case).
80. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir. 1977).
81. Serota & Singer, supra note 57, at 414 (citations omitted).
82. For just one example of a discussion of the competing concerns that go into
the design of VA’s adjudicative system, see Marcy W. Kreindler & Sarah B.
Richmond, Expedited Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA): A Balancing Act Between
Efficiency and Protecting Due Process Rights of Claimants, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 55 (2010).
83. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Should We Do About Social Security Disability
Appeals?, 34 REGULATION 41 (2011) (arguing that much of the Social Security
disability insurance decision-making process should be abolished because it produces
inaccurate results that dramatically favor the granting of non-meritorious claims).
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that were not merited led to legislative backlash in both the
nineteenth84 and twentieth centuries.85 Thus, bright-line rules that
are less likely to lead to exploitation help the Secretary guard the
political capital that sustains public legitimacy of the veterans benefits
program, and help the system remain friendly for future generations
of veterans.
Finally, the Secretary has to decide how best to distribute the finite
funds that Congress makes available for veterans benefits. The cost
of running the adjudication system competes with other worthy
programs in VA’s budget. The bulk of VA’s discretionary budget is
spent on increasing access to health care,86 but VA runs many other
programs to help veterans as well, such as the current Secretary’s
campaign to end homelessness among veterans.87 Particularly in this
era of tight budget constraints,88 each dollar that is spent on the
overhead of administering veterans benefits claims89 is a dollar that
cannot be spent on providing access to health care, assisting
homeless veterans, or providing other important services to veterans.
Given the myriad of health care, readjustment, and disability needs
among the nation’s sixty million veterans and dependents,90
84. See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 148 (noting that widespread fraudulent claims
led “Congress to abolish the current rolls and force all veterans to reapply for
benefits”).
85. Id. at 168–72.
86. In 2011, VA requested $62 billion in discretionary funds for fiscal year 2012.
U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2012: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 55 (2011) (statement of Eric K. Shinseki,
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs), available at http://veterans.house.gov/hearingtranscript/final-transcript-hearing-us-department-veterans-affairs-budget-requestfiscal. Nearly 90% of these discretionary funds are used to provide health care to
veterans. VETERANS FOR VETERANS ET AL., THE INDEPENDENT BUDGET: CRITICAL ISSUES
REPORT
FISCAL
YEAR
2013,
at
5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.independentbudget.org/2013/CI_2013.pdf.
87. See, e.g., Homeless Veterans, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://www.va.gov/homeless (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (detailing current programs
to combat homelessness among veterans).
88. VA has not been immune from the current budget difficulties. For example,
the national commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars recently testified before
Congress that at current spending levels “it will take VA more than 25 years to
complete its current 10-year capital investment plan.” See VA’s Budget Request for Fiscal
Year 2013, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of Raymond Kelley, Director, Nat’l Legislative Serv., Veterans of Foreign
Wars of the U.S.), available at http://www.vfw.org/VFW-in-DC/CongressionalTestimony/VA%E2%80%99S-BUDGET-REQUEST-FOR-FISCAL-YEAR-2013/.
89. For some perspective on the problem, it is worth noting that, if replacing a
generally applicable, bright-line rule with a fuzzier standard were to add only five
minutes to the time it takes to process a claim, that could amount to an annual
burden of up to 100,000 hours (or fifty full-time employees) in a system that handles
1.2 million claims in a year.
90. Strategic Goals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bamc.amedd.
army.mil/wtb/docs/va-pamphlet.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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determining an allocation of VA’s budget that would be most friendly
to veterans is a difficult, if not impossible, task.91 In this context,
using rules to hold down administrative costs is friendly to all the
veterans who otherwise would not be assisted through VA’s other
programs.
Accordingly, the Secretary’s system-wide perspective need not be
considered antagonistic to veterans, even though it may conflict with
some arguments at the Federal Circuit. Indeed, the eminent
administrative-law scholar Jerry Mashaw has argued that due process
values are served by an emphasis on good management of front-line
adjudicators, because the nature of disability benefits programs
“severely limit[s] the value of procedural safeguards and appellate
checks in assuring accurate and timely adjudication” of claims.92
Ultimately, as with the Chevron-versus-Gardner framing, this view of
the rules-versus-standards debate is not a panacea. However, it can be
useful in understanding how VA can take positions in individual cases
that may be contrary to arguments that appear “veteran friendly” in
isolation. Whether this framing is useful in understanding the
Federal Circuit’s veterans law jurisprudence is a question for further
consideration.
91. It is, however, worth examining the current allocation of funds. Michael
Asimow and Jeffrey S. Lubbers recently argued that aspects of the Australian model
of administrative appeals may be useful as models for reforming administrative
appeals in the United States. Michael Asimow & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Merits of
“Merits” Review: A Comparative Look at the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 28
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 261, 281–82 (2010). Although they do not consider
resource allocation in their argument, the facts they cite make for interesting
comparisons. Asimow and Lubbers note that the Australian system spends over
$30,000 USD per appeal (assuming the recent average conversion rate of nearly one
U.S. dollar to one Australian dollar) and administrative law judges who handle
disability claims decide approximately 100 to 150 cases a year per full-time equivalent
(depending upon the rate of production of part-time judges). Id. at 266–67. This is
a dramatically higher investment of resources in administrative appeals than in the
American VA system. In fiscal year 2010, the BVA decided an average of 682 appeals
per member, with a budget of $1490 per decision. See 1 DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION (FY 2012) 2C-5
(2011),
available
at
http://www.va.gov/budget/products.asp (stating that the BVA’s actual budget for
fiscal year 2010 was $73.3 million); BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN
FISCAL
YEAR
2010,
at
3,
19
(2011),
available
at
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2010AR.pdf (stating that
the BVA issued 49,127 decisions with sixty members and the equivalent of twelve
acting members). Accordingly, it appears that Australian administrative appeals are
supported by twenty times more resources, which, inter alia, allow their
administrative law judges handling disability claims to decide one-fifth the number of
cases as their counterparts at the BVA. Even assuming some inaccuracy due to
estimations and conversions, the spending gap is massive and raises questions about
why the two systems have such dramatically different allocations of resources.
92. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 775 (1974).
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D. General Conclusions
A thorough examination of the role of rules and standards in the
veterans system is beyond the scope of this Article, as is a normative
analysis of how best to interpret the concept of veteran friendliness.
Either topic would involve a wide variety of considerations. For
purposes of this Article, the most that can be done is to ask whether
Gugliuzza’s observation is supported by empirical evidence. If the
Federal Circuit were to favor standards, it would not necessarily mean
that the court would favor either side in any given case.93 In the few
cases Gugliuzza discussed, he observed that rulings in favor of
standards did not uniformly result in rulings in favor of one side.94 If
it were true, however, that there are institutional reasons why the
parties systematically tend to gravitate toward arguments of one type
over the other, then exploring the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in
the area would be a worthy endeavor.95
III. THE 2011 VETERANS BENEFITS DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
This Part considers the veterans law cases decided by the Federal
Circuit in 2011. The court issued eleven precedential decisions on
veterans law96: three fewer than in 2010, and still down significantly
from its earlier production rate.97 As with last year’s Article, these
cases will be considered in the order in which the issues would
normally be encountered in processing a benefits claim.
A. Duty to Assist
The Federal Circuit decided two cases in 2011 clarifying the scope
93. Given the substantial changes in the make-up of the court, there is also no
certainty that any past tendency would continue into the future.
94. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1221.
95. A secondary issue of great significance is how VA responds, consciously or
unconsciously, to any such tendency. In the realm of patent law, Jonathan Masur
argued that fear of reversals by the Federal Circuit has created inflationary pressure
within the Patent and Trademark Office, which has substantially increased the rate at
which it grants patents. Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473–74
(2011). Arti K. Rai has challenged that argument as over-estimating the influence of
the court on the operation of the agency. Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the Federal
Circuit?, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 337 (2011).
96. The Federal Circuit also issued published opinions on four CAVC decisions
on attorney fee petitions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481,
94 Stat. 2325 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006)). See Patrick v. Shinseki,
668 F.3d 1325, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Padgett v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 950, 950–51 (Fed.
Cir. 2011); Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Avgoustis v.
Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, these cases are not
discussed here, as they do not pertain to the law governing veterans’ benefits.
97. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1220–21.
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of VA’s duty to assist veterans. Both cases dealt with VA’s duty to
develop evidence in support of a claim. The Secretary’s duty is
codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5103A, which requires the VA to “make
reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence necessary
to substantiate the claimant’s claim.”98
1.

Adequacy of a VA medical examination
Whenever a veteran submits evidence that indicates that a disability
may be related to service, but which is insufficient to decide the
claim, the Secretary must obtain a medical opinion to resolve the
issue.99 In Sickels v. Shinseki,100 the Federal Circuit had to address both
the adequacy of a medical opinion and the Board’s analysis of that
issue.101 The veteran’s claim for service connection for a knee
condition was remanded by the Board for a medical opinion and any
examination or testing deemed necessary.102 On remand, the cover
of the request for a medical opinion had “NO EXAM AT THIS
TIME” repeatedly printed on it, and the physician rendered an
opinion without examining the veteran.103 However, the detailed
instructions indicated that “[i]f the medical specialist deems it to be
necessary, the veteran should undergo a VA examination and/or
diagnostic testing.”104 The physician provided an opinion without
examining the veteran or ordering any testing. The Board accepted
the new opinion as satisfying its instructions and denied the claim on
the basis of the new opinion.105 In a single-judge decision, the CAVC
rejected the appellant’s argument that the instructions to the
examiner were confusing, as the appellant failed to make that
argument to the Board and because the examiner must be presumed
competent.106
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the CAVC in an
opinion by Judge Clevenger. As is frequently the case, the initial
issue was jurisdiction. The government argued that the appellant was
merely challenging the adequacy of the examination in his case, but
the Federal Circuit accepted the appellant’s contention that the issue
was whether the BVA was obligated to provide a detailed statement in
98. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a) (2006).
99. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006) (discussing 38 U.S.C.
§ 5103A(d)(2)).
100. 643 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
101. Id. at 1363–64.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1364.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1365.
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every case as to why it found that the medical opinion was
adequate.107
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit rejected that argument, finding it
indistinguishable from the argument rejected in Rizzo v. Shinseki.108
In Rizzo, the court concluded that the Board was not required to
address the competency of a VA medical examiner if it were not
challenged.109 The Sickels court similarly concluded that the Board
could not be “fault[ed] for failing to explain its reasoning on
unraised issues” as to the adequacy of the medical examination.110
This discussion in Sickles was an interesting follow-up to the court’s
prior decision in Robinson v. Shinseki,111 which dealt with the Board’s
duty to support its decision with an adequate statement of reasons or
bases.112 In Robinson, the Federal Circuit held that “claims which have
no support in the record need not be considered by the Board,” and
that “the Board is not obligated to consider all possible substantive
theories of recovery.”113 In essence, Sickles appeared to apply a similar
standard to issues regarding the adequacy of the medical opinion.
However, Robinson was not cited and the phrasing of the opinions was
different. Thus, there remains room for future elaboration as to the
Board’s duty to discuss issues in claims on review.
2.

Necessity of an industrial survey
The second issue addressed by the Federal Circuit concerning the
duty to assist relates to a veteran’s entitlement to a rating of total
disability based upon individual unemployability (TDIU). The rating
is awarded when a veteran meets certain threshold criteria based
upon his or her schedular disability rating and is “unable to secure or
follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of serviceconnected disabilities.”114 In contrast to schedular disability ratings,
which are objective, a rating of TDIU is based upon a veteran’s
subjective ability to work, including consideration of his or her
education, experience, and training.115
The question presented in Smith v. Shinseki116 was whether VA was
required to obtain an industrial survey from a vocational expert
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
580 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1292.
Sickels, 643 F.3d at 1366.
557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1361.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2011).
See id. § 4.16(b).
647 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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before deciding the veteran’s entitlement to TDIU.117
The
foundation of the appellant’s argument was that such surveys are
used in the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) system to
determine whether disability benefits should be awarded.118 The
appellant argued that an industrial survey was necessary to
substantiate entitlement to TDIU, and that VA therefore was
obligated to provide him with one before deciding his claim.119
In an opinion authored by Judge Dyk, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the single-judge decision of the CAVC, rejecting the appellant’s
argument.120 The court held that a TDIU rating in the veterans
benefits system is substantively different from a disability
determination in the SSDI system.121 The court observed that, in the
SSDI system, the disability determination considers the availability of
appropriate employment in the applicant’s locality, and the burden is
on the government to prove that such work exists.122 The opinion in
Smith noted that, in contrast, “[t]he VA regulation governing TDIU
claims includes no requirement that the agency consider the
availability of work.”123 The opinion then considered the VA’s
Adjudication Procedures Manual M21-1MR and observed that it
explicitly states that “the ‘availability of work’ is an ‘extraneous factor’
that is irrelevant to the TDIU determination.”124 Based upon this
language, the court deferred to VA’s interpretation of its own
regulation because it was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.125 In its conclusion, the opinion took care to note
that VA had the discretion to obtain such a survey in a given case if it
decided that the survey were necessary, but that such an opinion is
not invariably required.126 The opinion ended with the comment
that, assuming the court had jurisdiction to consider the facts of this
case, it could not conclude on these facts that the VA abused its
discretion in declining to provide a vocational expert.127
Smith is consistent with early CAVC case law recognizing that the
SSDI system is meaningfully different from the veterans benefits
117. Id. at 1382.
118. Id. at 1385.
119. Id. at 1383.
120. Id. at 1382.
121. Id. at 1385.
122. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c) (2011)).
123. Id. at 1384.
124. Id. (quoting DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES MANUAL
REWRITE M21-1MR, pt. IV-ii, ch. 2, § F, at 12, available at http://www.benefits.va.gov/
WARMS/Site_Map.asp).
125. Id. at 1385.
126. Id. at 1386.
127. Id.
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scheme and that its determinations, therefore, should be considered
persuasive at most rather than binding.128 Although modern social
programs may trace their roots to the veterans benefits system,129
veterans fought against having their benefits folded into larger, New
Deal social programs such as Social Security.130 Accordingly, the two
programs share only a modest similarity to each other. Thus, the
result of Smith is unsurprising.
B. Service Connection
In 2011, the Federal Circuit decided only a single case discussing
the substance of the central issue of when disability benefits should
be granted. That case dealt with an evidentiary issue in the relatively
narrow category of cases in which benefits are sought for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) stemming from an in-service
personal assault.131 One unique aspect of a claim for compensation
for PTSD is that there is an explicit requirement that there must be
evidence to corroborate the occurrence of the stressful event
(stressor) upon which the claim is based.132 It is generally insufficient
that a medical professional believes that the veteran has PTSD and
that the veteran’s account of the stressor is accurate; rather,
independent evidence of the stressor is required.133 A special rule
applies to combat stressors. If the stressor were related to combat,
then it would be sufficient to corroborate generally that the veteran
was involved in combat.134 However, if the stressor were not combatrelated, then more specific corroboration would be required.135
128. See Collier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 413, 417 (1991) (comparing and
contrasting the Social Security and VA systems).
129. See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 7–11 (1992) (asserting that pensions
for Civil War veterans and for widowed mothers in the early twentieth century were
precursors to the New Deal era reforms); GILBERT Y. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE
237–40 (1971) (discussing old age, disability, and survivors’ pensions for veterans
within the context of the greater welfare system).
130. See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 181–82 (discussing veterans’ efforts to support
New Deal social programs yet maintain the separate nature of their own benefits
programs).
131. Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
132. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70, 76 (1994) (outlining the evidentiary
corroboration requirements for PTSD claims).
133. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 145 (1997) (finding that a Vietnam
veteran’s stressor was sufficiently corroborated by his fellow service member’s
statement of frequent exposure to mortar attacks).
134. See Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 310 (1997) (noting that the veteran’s
radio logs sufficiently corroborated his stressor when he did not engage in combat);
West, 7 Vet. App. at 76 (holding that the veteran’s personal participation in the
stressful event does not need to be shown by the corroborating evidence when the
veteran engaged in combat).
135. West, 7 Vet. App. at 76.

RIDGWAY.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/14/2012 6:54 PM

2011 VETERANS LAW DECISIONS

1195

In Menegassi v. Shinseki,136 the Federal Circuit had to consider
whether in-service personal assaults are subject to their own special
rules regarding corroboration.137 The regulation governing in-service
personal assaults provides that evidence from sources other than the
veteran’s service records may corroborate the veteran’s account of
the stressor incident.138
The regulation proceeds to provide
examples, such as records from law enforcement authorities, rape
crisis centers, mental health counseling centers, hospitals, or
physicians.139 However, the regulation does not indicate whether
records from health counseling centers, hospitals, or physicians must
be contemporaneous with the alleged stressor or can be separate
from a subsequent diagnosis.
In Menegassi, the veteran filed a claim in 2001 alleging that she was
sexually assaulted in service in 1984.140 The BVA determined that
“there was no evidence of a reported sexual assault or behavioral
changes from the in-service medical records, in-service personnel
records, or any other records contemporaneous to the veteran’s
service.”141 On appeal, a single judge of the CAVC affirmed the BVA
in a memorandum decision, and quoted Cohen v. Brown142 for the
proposition that “[a]n opinion by a mental health professional based
on a post-service examination of the veteran cannot be used to
establish the occurrence of the stressor.”143
In an opinion by Judge Prost, the Federal Circuit held that section
3.304(f)(5) created an exception to the rule expressed in Cohen.144
Reaching this conclusion was relatively simple because VA had noted
in promulgating the regulation that “a doctor’s diagnosis of PTSD
due to personal assault—if competent and credible—in the absence
of contrary evidence, would likely constitute competent medical
evidence sufficient to corroborate the occurrence of the stressor.”145
Accordingly, the parties agreed that the CAVC had erred.146
What divided the court was the issue of whether the CAVC’s error
in relying on Cohen in the context of a personal assault case was
harmless. Although Judge Prost, joined by Chief Judge Rader, held
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

638 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1380–81.
38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(5) (2011).
Id.
Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1380.
Id.
10 Vet. App. 128 (1997).
Menegassi, 638 F.3d at 1381 (quoting Cohen, 10 Vet. App. at 145).
Id. at 1382.
Id. at 1381–82 (discussing 67 Fed. Reg. 10,330–31 (Mar. 7, 2002)).
Id.
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that the error was not prejudicial, Judge Dyk disagreed on the facts.147
There was no dispute among the judges that the Federal Circuit
could decide the issue of whether the error was harmless in this case
because the facts were undisputed.148 However, the majority felt that
the BVA had exhaustively detailed the evidence and applied the law
correctly, regardless of the misstatement in the CAVC decision.149 In
contrast, Judge Dyk interpreted the BVA decision as applying the
same bright-line rule that the CAVC had erroneously stated.150
Accordingly, he would have remanded the matter for a new decision
by the BVA because the Federal Circuit could not properly make a
determination as to what the BVA would have found if it had applied
the correct standard.151
Menegassi highlights the fact that the Federal Circuit’s review of
decisions rendered by the CAVC does not always focus on those
decisions. Prejudicial error, in particular, is an aspect where the
court may spend a great deal of time examining the BVA’s decision
rather than the CAVC’s. It is unclear whether the court’s analysis of
decisions an extra-step removed could increase the likelihood of split
decisions. If enough data were collected, however, it would be
interesting to determine whether the judges have distinctly different
approaches to interpreting BVA decisions.
C. Effective Date
In 2011, the Federal Circuit also decided a single case addressing
the proper effective date for benefits. The effective date for an award
of benefits “shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but
shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application
therefor.”152 In practice, most effective date determinations turn on
the determination of when the claim was filed because veterans rarely
file a claim before actually being eligible. Frequently, claims are
granted only after being reopened years after a prior denial, and in
that situation the effective date is the date of the claim to reopen.153

147. Id. at 1384 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 1383 (majority opinion) (citing Wood v. Peake, 520 F.3d 1345, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1384 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 1384–85.
152. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2011) (stating that the
effective date will be fixed as the date of receipt of the claim or the date the
entitlement arose, whichever is earlier).
153. Flash v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 332, 340 (1995); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(r)
(applying the effective date rule to reopened claims).
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In Bond v. Shinseki,154 the Federal Circuit addressed a key exception
to the effective date limitation for new claims.155 Pursuant to 38
C.F.R. section 3.156(b), “[n]ew and material evidence received prior
to the expiration of the appeal period . . . will be considered as
having been filed in connection with the claim which was pending at
the beginning of the appeal period.”156 The CAVC previously held
that the submission of new and material evidence under this
regulation would prevent a rating decision from becoming final if VA
were to fail to properly address it.157
The question presented in Bond was whether VA could treat new
evidence submitted within the period for appealing a grant of service
connection as a claim for an increased disability rating without
considering the application of section 3.156(b).158 In Bond, the
veteran submitted evidence that was potentially new and material, but
provided it with a letter “respectfully request[ing] an increase in
percentage rating” for his PTSD.159 He was eventually awarded an
increased disability rating, and VA based his effective date on the
letter, treating it as a claim for an increased rating without any
consideration of the possible application of the regulation on new
and material evidence submitted during the appellate period.160
Although the appellant was appealing an unfavorable single-judge
decision by the CAVC, Judge O’Malley’s opinion for the Federal
Circuit largely focused on the government’s arguments defending the
outcome of the effective date determination. The government
argued that the veteran’s characterization of his submission as
seeking an increased rating was dispositive and that VA therefore did
not need to consider the possible application of the regulation.161
The court rejected this argument, noting that section 3.156(b) is
phrased in mandatory terms and that “neither law—nor logic—
dictates that evidence supporting a new claim cannot also constitute

154. 659 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
155. Id. at 1364 n.1.
156. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b).
157. Bond, 659 F.3d at 1365 (citing Muehl v. West, 13 Vet. App. 159, 161–62
(1999)). Although not relevant to the analysis in Bond, it has been argued that the
regulation is better understood as one that causes the new claim to relate back to the
filing of the original claim, rather than one that prevents the original claim from
becoming final. See Young v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 461, 472–75 (2009) (Lance, J.,
concurring) (suggesting a framework by which the regulation achieves its objectives
without vitiating the finality of earlier decisions).
158. Bond, 659 F.3d at 1366–67.
159. Id. at 1363.
160. Id. at 1364.
161. Id. at 1367.
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new and material evidence relating to a pending claim.”162
Accordingly, VA’s duty to apply the regulation was not obviated by
either the appellant’s characterization of his submission or the fact
that the submission met the requirements for a valid increased rating
claim.163
The Secretary also argued that VA should be presumed to have
considered the possible application of section 3.156(b), and that the
rating decision should be regarded as implicitly determining that the
regulation was not satisfied.164 The Federal Circuit rejected such a
presumption because it would “effectively insulate the VA’s errors
from review whenever it fails to fulfill an obligation, but leaves no
firm trace of its dereliction in the record.”165 Accordingly, the court
remanded the matter for an explicit determination by VA as to
whether section 3.156(b) would be applicable in the case.166
Although the court’s opinion in Bond did not invoke the
sympathetic reading doctrine, its analysis and conclusion are clearly
consistent with the idea that “it is the Secretary who knows the
provisions of title 38 and can evaluate whether there is potential
under the law to compensate an averred disability based on a
sympathetic reading of the material in a pro se submission.”167
The more interesting aspect of Bond is squaring it with the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Sickels discussed above, which held that the
Board could not be faulted for failing to discuss an issue that was not
raised to it.168 The CAVC has held that “[t]he question of the precise
location of the line between the issues fairly raised by the appellant’s
pleadings and the record and those that are not must be based on the
record in the case at hand; therefore, it is an essentially factual
question.”169 Once again, although the Federal Circuit does not
review factual determinations, its decisions are necessarily shaped by
the facts of the cases before it and factual differences will therefore
necessarily matter even when they are not the explicit subject of the
differing opinions. However, it will take more than the two data
points available in the Federal Circuit’s 2011 cases to develop a full
162. Id. at 1367–68.
163. Id. at 1369.
164. Id. at 1368.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 256–57 (2007) (per curiam)
(explaining why a “four corners” review of a veteran’s application is overly strict).
168. See supra Part III.A.1 (outlining when VA is required to provide a medical
examination).
169. Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 553 (2008), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v.
Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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picture of its views on when the BVA is obligated to address issues not
explicitly raised by the claimant.
D. Disability Rating
The Federal Circuit issued three opinions in 2011 dealing with
disability ratings. The relative attention granted to this area is not
surprising, given the complexity of the regulations in determining
how much compensation should be paid to a veteran each month
based upon the severity of his or her disabilities. Part 4 of Title 38 of
the Code of Federal Regulations has hundreds of “diagnostic codes”
detailing how to rate disabilities of every body part and physical
system on a scale from 0% to 100% disabling.170 When these codes
are insufficient, there are also provisions for extra-schedular ratings
and special monthly compensation to further tailor the monthly
payments.171 Thus, there is ample fodder for legal questions to arise.
1.

Staged ratings
The first disability rating case of this past year returned to an area
that the court addressed in 2009 in Reizenstein v. Shinseki.172 Given the
long periods of time that are often at issue in veterans benefits cases,
VA often must determine the proper disability rating for a condition,
the severity of which has changed over the course of the proceedings.
In such a circumstance, VA may assign a “staged” rating, which is one
that breaks up the life of the claim into smaller periods with different
ratings consistent with the evidence for each time period.173 In
Reizenstein, the Federal Circuit held that 38 C.F.R. section 3.343(a),
which protects certain ratings from reduction without a current
medical examination, does not apply to the initial award of a staged
rating that decreases from a protected level.174
This past year, the Federal Circuit addressed this issue again in
Singleton v. Shinseki,175 in which the appellant (represented by the
same attorney as in Reizenstein) repackaged his procedural argument
as a due process claim.176 After obtaining a favorable decision from
the CAVC on an effective date appeal, the appellant in Singleton
170. 38 C.F.R. § 4.27 (2011).
171. Id. § 4.16(b).
172. 583 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Eaton, supra note 1, at 1196–97
(analyzing the decision).
173. See Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1999) (noting that the
Secretary and the appellant agreed that at the time of an initial rating, separate
ratings may be assigned based on the facts that arise).
174. 583 F.3d at 1336–37.
175. 659 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
176. Id. at 1334.
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received a staged rating covering more than twenty years.177 The
rating was divided into four periods, which included a reduction
from 100% for the period from 1980 to 1991 to 70% for the period
from 1991 to 2000.178 In an opinion by Judge Prost, the court
affirmed the panel opinion of the CAVC.179
The first issue that the court addressed was the reframing of the
argument. When his case was before the CAVC, the appellant made
essentially the same regulatory argument that was rejected in
Reizenstein.180 To avoid the effect of that decision, “Mr. Singleton
applied a fresh coat of paint in the hope of attracting more favorable
judicial treatment.”181
Specifically, he argued that the rating
reduction for the period after 1991 denied him property without due
process of law because he did not have an adequate opportunity to
submit new evidence and argument before his benefits were
reduced.182 The government objected to this reframing, but the
Federal Circuit explained in a footnote that, “[t]hough the new
constitutional gloss Mr. Singleton has applied to his case before this
court was not present below, his argument is essentially consistent
with his previous positions and in this unique circumstance” it was
cognizable by the court.183
On the merits, the court applied the traditional three-part
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.184 Although the panel agreed
that the appellant had a protected property interest, it concluded
that the normal procedures attendant in the BVA and CAVC
proceedings “were sufficient . . . to expose any error.”185 It further
concluded that “the government has a straightforward interest in the
speedy resolution of Mr. Singleton’s claim” and that “[a]dding
further rounds of review (and, potentially, further rounds of appeal)
would require yet more hours of labor and additional adjudication
costs for the government.”186 Thus, the court concluded that there
was no due process violation.187
After Reizenstein, the outcome of Singleton is not surprising. What is
more interesting is the court’s discussion allowing the constitutional
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1333–34.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1336, aff’g 23 Vet. App. 376 (2010).
583 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Singleton, 659 F.3d at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1334–35 n.2.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Singleton, 659 F.3d at 1336.
Id.
Id.
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argument to be raised in the first place. In 2009, the Federal Circuit
opened the door to due process arguments in veterans benefits cases
by holding in Cushman v. Shinseki188 that applicants for benefits have a
property interest protected by due process.189 There can be little
doubt that many veterans advocates are anxious to raise such
arguments. However, the long process of appealing from the BVA to
the CAVC before reaching the Federal Circuit means that it may be
some time before such arguments arrive at the Federal Circuit after
full development, including agency consideration. Singleton suggests
that the court will allow some constitutional arguments to be heard
without a full presentation below, but is not anxious to short-cut the
proper development of such issues.190
2.

Special monthly compensation
Veterans who are exceptionally disabled may qualify for special
monthly compensation (SMC) beyond the normal 100% disability
rate. There are a number of such provisions detailed in 38 U.S.C.
§ 1114(k)–(s), and one of those provisions led to a divided opinion of
the court in Guerra v. Shinseki.191 The SMC provision at issue in Guerra
was § 1114(s), which provides an additional monthly payment if the
veteran were to have had a “service-connected disability rated as
total,” and either: (1) had another independent disability or
combination of disabilities rated at 60%; or (2) was permanently
house-bound by reason of service-connected disability.192
The veteran in Guerra had multiple disabilities stemming from a
single combat incident: “a 70% rating for an upper-extremity
gunshot wound, a 70% rating for post-traumatic stress disorder, a
40% rating for injuries to his left leg and thigh, a 40% rating for
injuries to his right leg and thigh, and a 30% rating for
neuropathy.”193 Under the table for combining multiple disability
ratings,194 the veteran’s overall schedular rating was 100%.195 In a
single-judge decision, the CAVC held that the veteran was not eligible
188. 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
189. Id. at 1298.
190. Of course, the appellant in Singleton could have raised his due process
argument prior to Cushman, because there is no question that due process applies to
the reduction or termination of benefits already awarded. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985) (holding that the Court need
not resolve the question of whether applicants for veterans benefits have a protected
interest because some of the class members were already receiving benefits).
191. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
192. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006).
193. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048.
194. 38 C.F.R. § 4.25 (2011).
195. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048.
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for SMC under subsection (s) because none of his individual injuries
was rated as 100% disabling by itself.196 In reaching this conclusion,
the decision explicitly followed the CAVC’s panel opinion in Bradley
v. Peake.197
In an opinion by Judge Bryson and joined by Judge Moore, the
Federal Circuit rejected the appellant’s argument that he could be
eligible for SMC based on his combined rating without regard to the
fact that none of his individual conditions was rated as totally
disabling. The opinion began with the plain language of the statute,
which refers to “a service-connected disability rated as total,”198 but
noted that “the use of the singular is not by itself dispositive.”199 The
opinion looked to the other parts of the SMC statute and noted that,
“[a]mong the seven special monthly compensation provisions in
section 1114, the use of the singular indefinite article in referring to a
disability . . . is unique to subsection (s).”200 The opinion further
noted that, “[e]ven within subsection (s), the statute distinguishes
between a single ‘disability’ [in the first prong] and multiple
‘disabilities’ [in the second prong].”201 The court thus concluded
that Congress’s intent was evidenced by the language of the statute.202
However, rather than declaring the language dispositive, the opinion
proceeded to allow that it “is not entirely free from ambiguity” and
applied Chevron deference to the Secretary’s interpretation as
expressed in the implementing regulation, which has been in effect
since 1962.203
The Federal Circuit expressly rejected an argument from the
appellant that a cross-reference that once existed in VA’s
Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1 was relevant to the
outcome.204 That reference referred to the definition of “single
disability” for TDIU purposes, which defines “one disability” to
include multiple disabilities resulting from a single incident.205 The
opinion rejected the argument both because the cross-reference had
been removed in 1995 before the claim was filed,206 and because the
inference from the cross-reference in the procedure manual was
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
22 Vet. App. 280 (2008).
38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) (2006).
Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1049.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1049–50.
Id. at 1050.
Id. (discussing 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (2011)).
Id.
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contradicted by a formal opinion from VA’s Office of General
Counsel (OGC) in 1991 that interpreted the statute contrary to the
inference.207
The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that either the
removal of the cross-reference or the issuance of the OGC opinion
required compliance with the notice and comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act208 to be valid. It did so on the basis that
neither was a substantive rule.209 The majority opinion explained that
“[a] substantive rule represents an agency’s exercise of the power
delegated to it by Congress to ‘effect a change in existing law or
policy or . . . affect individual rights and obligations,’” whereas “[a]n
interpretive rule thus ‘represents the agency’s reading of statutes and
rules rather than an attempt to make new law or modify existing
law.’”210 In the majority’s view, both the 1991 OGC opinion and the
1995 modification of the M21-1 manual were clearly interpretive
actions.211
Judge Gajarsa dissented, arguing that “[t]he majority makes two
errors in its analysis.”212 In his view, the majority erred in selectively
reading the statute and in perceiving ambiguity in wording that
should have been interpreted in favor of the veteran under
Gardner.213 In Judge Gajarsa’s view, it was necessary to look beyond
the SMC provision in § 1114 to note that the schedular rating
provisions in subparts (a)–(j) use the singular (the disability), even
though those provisions clearly apply to combined ratings.214 He
then went beyond the language of the statute to note that “the
legislative history of section 1114(s) demonstrates that the very
purpose of the section was to provide additional benefits to those
veterans who were totally disabled under section 1114(j) but had
additional, severe disabilities.”215 He quoted several passages in
support of his view that the intent of § 1114(s) was to provide “an
intermediate benefit for those veterans who were more seriously
injured than those having only a total disability but not requiring
constant care.”216 Judge Gajarsa then parsed the language of the
provision further, before declaring that “the language of § 1114(s) is
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 1050–51.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1051.
Id. (quoting Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1195–96 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
Id.
Id. at 1052 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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clear” in favor of the veteran.217 He rejected the majority’s assertion
that Chevron deference was required, and countered that, “[t]o the
extent that any ambiguity does exist in § 1114(s)—as the majority
suggests—it should be resolved in favor of the veteran” under
Gardner.218
The majority’s paragraph addressing Judge Gajarsa’s opinion
focused on his Gardner argument. The majority noted that the
Federal Circuit had “rejected the argument that the pro-veteran
canon of construction overrides the deference due to the DVA’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”219 Thus, the
majority affirmed the CAVC opinion over the dissent’s objection that
the matter should be remanded to the BVA to determine whether the
appellant would be entitled to a 100% disability rating based upon
the combined effects of his conditions other than PTSD.220
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Guerra is that the majority
cited the statement in Sears that Chevron trumps Gardner. As Linda
Jellum highlighted, the Federal Circuit and the CAVC rarely address
a square conflict between the two cases.221 She noted that both courts
have expressed the essential conclusion stated in Sears, but that
“neither court has explained why or whether Gardner’s [p]resumption
retains any vitality in light of this conclusion.”222 Neither the brief
citation to Sears in the majority opinion of Guerra nor the dismissal of
Chevron by the dissent does anything to dispel the uncertainty that
Jellum has explored at length. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
appellant in Guerra filed a petition for certiorari—supported by
Paralyzed Veterans of America, the American Legion, the National
Veterans Legal Services Program, and the Federal Circuit Bar
Association—which would have given the Supreme Court an
opportunity to squarely resolve the tension between the cases.223
Unfortunately, the Court denied certiorari, despite substantial
support for the petition.224

217. Id. at 1053–54.
218. Id. at 1054 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994)).
219. Id. at 1051 (majority opinion) (citing Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–
32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
220. Id. at 1052; id. at 1054–55 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting).
221. Jellum, supra note 70, at 75–88 (analyzing numerous cases from the two
courts).
222. Id. at 88.
223. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Guerra v. Shinseki, No. 11-773 (U.S. Dec. 19,
2011); see SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?
FileName=/docketfiles/11-773.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012) (docket for Guerra v.
Shinseki).
224. Guerra v. Shinseki, No. 11-773, 2012 WL 986851, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2012).
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3.

Protected disability ratings
The final disability rating case of 2011 involves VA’s ability to
modify a protected disability rating. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1159,
“[s]ervice connection for any disability . . . which has been in force
for ten or more years shall not be severed,” unless there is a showing
of fraud or inadequate character of service.225 In Read v. Shinseki,226
the court had to address whether this provision was violated when VA
modified a veteran’s disability rating to change the location of a
disability from one muscle group to another.227
The veteran in Read suffered a gunshot wound in 1968 and was
granted service connection in 1995 based upon his stated “residuals,
gunshot wound, right thigh.”228 The diagnostic code used to rate his
condition (DC 5313) was for injuries to muscle group XIII, the
posterior thigh group.229 However, the award was not based on any
objective testing to determine the precise location of the injury that
was causing his functional limitations.230
Just over ten years later, during the processing of a claim for an
increased rating, the appellant had a VA physical that identified the
location of his injury as muscle group XV instead of XIII.231 The
appellant then received a rating decision that maintained his 10%
disability rating, but VA switched the diagnostic code to reflect the
new evaluation of the location of the injury.232 The CAVC affirmed
the propriety of this action in a single-judge decision that concluded
that the veteran’s 1995 rating was not improperly severed by
changing the identified location of the disability.233
In a panel opinion authored by Judge Linn, the Federal Circuit
also affirmed the action. The court’s opinion is unusual in that it
began with an extensive discussion of the historical context that led
to the enactment of § 1159.234 The opinion opened by noting that,
“[d]uring World War II, the Veteran’s Administration, now known as
[the VA], often granted service connection for disabilities ‘without
properly checking records and in many instances approved service

225. 38 U.S.C. § 1159 (2006).
226. 651 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
227. Id. at 1300.
228. Id. at 1298.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1299.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Read v. Shinseki, No. 07-3461, 2009 WL 3367647, at *1 (Vet. App.
Oct. 21, 2009), aff’d, 651 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
234. Id. at 1297–98.
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connection when it was not warranted.’”235 It continued to discuss
how a 1954 review of over one million claims led to thousands of
severances and reductions, which provoked a backlash that led to the
passage of § 1159.236 The opinion concluded its historical prelude by
stating that “Congress intended by this statute to ‘merely freeze[] the
determination of service connection, that is . . . the finding by the
Veterans Administration that the disability was incurred or
aggravated by military service.’”237
The formal analysis of the Read opinion follows logically from the
background provided before the recitation of the facts. The court
concluded that the protection statute applies to only the element of
service connection and not to the details of the disability rating
awarded.238 Thus, the court stated that, “[b]ecause § 1159 does not
protect the fact of a disability . . . the change in the determination of
the applicable Diagnostic Code likewise is unprotected.”239 This
conclusion, however, was not enough to put an end to the matter.
Rather, the opinion continued to address in detail the appellant’s
contention that the change in diagnostic code had the effect of
severing service connection for his disability to Muscle Group XIII,
even though the change effectively granted service connection for a
disability to a different muscle group.240 The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument for three reasons. First, it held, based upon the
applicable regulation, that “the disability for which service
connection is protected is more generally associated with the
veteran’s inability to perform certain acts.”241 Accordingly, changing
the diagnostic code was permissible when the new code was still
associated with the same limitations. Second, the court concluded
that this interpretation was consistent with the legislative purpose,
which “was to protect veterans with long-standing determinations of
service connection from suddenly having the determination of
service-connection stripped.”242 Third, the court determined that two
precedential opinions of VA’s Office of General Counsel were

235. Id. (quoting Miscellaneous Compensation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 113 and
H.R. 660 Before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Pensions of the H. Comm. on Veterans
Affairs, 86th Cong. 2208, 2198–99 (1960) (statement of Rep. Frank E. Smith, author
of H.R. 660)).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1298 (quoting S. REP. NO. 86-1394, at 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2338 (1960)).
238. Id. at 1300.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1301.
241. Id. (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.40 (2011)).
242. Id.
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entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,243 to the extent
that they concluded that correcting an inaccurate location or
diagnosis was a non-substantive change.244
Read is an interesting and unusual case because, instead of applying
the Gardner presumption as to Congress’s intent, the court analyzed
the legislative history of the provision to determine its specific intent
as to the provision at hand. That the court performs this type of
analysis so infrequently is a testament to how much of the history of
the statute and regulation are lost because of its New Deal origins,245
and because there was little need for documentation during the Iron
Triangle era.246 Moreover, what history was created was not well
preserved in an era in which there was virtually no litigation about
the meaning of the laws that existed. In recent years, various legal
research companies have begun to unbox much of the legislative
archives from the twentieth century and make it available online. To
the extent that some parts of Title 38 have legislative histories that
are being unearthed, it will be interesting to see if the Federal Circuit
will spend more time looking at such histories than relying on the
Gardner presumption.
E. Procedure
In 2011, the Federal Circuit published four opinions concerning
the procedures used to process veterans claims. Whereas most of the
other published decisions of the court were reviews of unpublished,
single-judge CAVC decisions, it is indicative of the importance of
procedure to the veterans benefits system that three of the four cases
on procedure reviewed divided, en banc opinions by the CAVC.
On the surface, the procedure for deciding veterans claims is
straightforward. Claimants receive an initial decision from the local
regional office (RO).247 They may dispute an unfavorable decision by
243. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
244. Read, 651 F.3d at 1302 (citing Wanless v. Shinseki, 618 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (applying the standard of deference required by Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. at 140)).
245. Much of the statutory language traces to executive orders issued in the wake
of the Economy Act of 1933. See Ridgway, supra note 49, at 181 n.306 (comparing the
language of those orders to the current provisions of Title 38). However, the true
authorship of those orders remains unknown. Id. (citing WILLIAM PYRLE DILLINGHAM,
FEDERAL AID TO VETERANS 1917–1941, at 38, 74–75 (1952)).
246. See id. at 188–89 (discussing the Iron Triangle); see also PAUL C. LIGHT,
FORGING LEGISLATION 5 (1992) (describing the Iron Triangle of the veterans lobby,
the Veterans Administration, and the House and Senate Veterans committees as “a
political force to be reckoned with”).
247. DOUGLAS REID WEIMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33704, VETERANS AFFAIRS:
THE APPEAL PROCESS FOR VETERANS’ CLAIMS 1 n.3 (2011).
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filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) within a year of that
decision.248 A claimant may submit new evidence before, with, or
after filing a NOD.249 However, if the claim were not granted, then
the RO would issue a Statement of the Case (SOC), which would
summarize the evidence and the law so that the claimant could better
understand the decision.250 The claimant would next perfect an
appeal by filing a Substantive Appeal with the BVA.251 The BVA then
would issue a decision, which must address not only all the issues
raised by the claimant, but also any issue reasonably raised by the
record.252 If the BVA were to deny a claim, then the BVA decision
may be appealed to the CAVC by filing a Notice of Appeal within 120
days of the BVA decision.253 However, the process could be
complicated by a number of factors due to the informal nature of the
system, the myriad of additional procedures designed to protect
claimants, and the difficulties that arise when the veteran has
multiple claims that may or may not be processed together.254 The
veterans law cases in 2011 provide a good sample of the issues that
can surface.
1.

Notice of Disagreement
One of the first issues that arises is determining exactly which RO
actions are properly classified as decisions that can be appealed. In
Hargrove v. Shinseki,255 the court held that the CAVC acted properly in
denying a pro se petition for mandamus asking VA to treat
correspondence filed prior to a final RO determination as an NOD.256
The veteran in Hargrove received a letter proposing to reduce his
disability rating and notifying him that he had sixty days to submit
evidence demonstrating that his rating should not be reduced.257 In
response, the veteran sent three different letters, which objected to
the reduction, submitted additional evidence, and asked for copies of
the evidence supporting the reduction.258 The regional office did not
treat any of these letters as an NOD, nor otherwise place the issue

248. 38 C.F.R. § 20.302 (2011).
249. Id. § 20.800.
250. Id. § 19.29.
251. Id. § 19.30.
252. Id. § 19.7.
253. WEIMER, supra note 247, at 12.
254. See generally Ridgway, supra note 72, at 273–78 (describing how the system
struggles to balance complexity and informality).
255. 629 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
256. Id. at 1379.
257. Id. at 1378.
258. Id.
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into appellate status.259 Eventually, the RO issued a final decision
reducing the veteran’s rating.260
Rather than filing an indisputable NOD as to the final rating
decision, the veteran filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus
with the CAVC.261 The petition sought recognition of the veteran’s
pre-decision correspondence as a NOD and an order requiring VA to
issue a SOC.262 The CAVC denied the petition in a single-judge
order.263 The order concluded that the veteran had an adequate
remedy without a writ because, at the time the CAVC issued its order,
the time period for filing an NOD had not yet expired.264 The
veteran appealed pro se to the Federal Circuit.265
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CAVC in a short
opinion by Judge Moore: “In light of the fact that Mr. Hargrove had
an adequate alternative means to attain the relief he requested, the
Veterans Court properly denied the writ of mandamus.”266 However,
Judge Moore was careful not to express an opinion as to whether VA
should have or could have treated the pre-decisional correspondence
as a NOD.267 Instead, the opinion focused on the conclusion that
mandamus was properly denied because the veteran did not need
court intervention at that point to achieve his goal of appealing his
claim.
Judge Newman dissented. Whereas the majority characterized the
appellant’s letters as “disagreeing with the proposed reduction,”268
Judge Newman’s dissent referred to each one as a “Notice of
Disagreement.”269 In Judge Newman’s view, even if the NODs were
defective, VA would be obligated to respond and explain that there
was a problem.270 She contended that it was unacceptable for the
Federal Circuit to “ratif[y] the VA inaction whereby the three Notices
of Disagreement were ignored by the Regional Office, with no notice
to the veteran,” and the court’s decision was “an affront to ‘the

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Hargrove v. Shinseki, No. 09-2657, 2009 WL 3493019, at *3 (Vet. App. Oct.
27, 2009), aff’d, 629 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
264. Hargrove, 629 F.3d at 1378.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1379.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1378.
269. The precise phrasing of the letters is not clear from either the Federal
Circuit’s or the CAVC’s decisions.
270. Hargrove, 629 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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principles underlying this uniquely pro-claimant system.’”271
Hargrove highlights two approaches to the veterans benefits system
and what it means to be “veteran friendly.” The approach that the
majority used focuses on the law and its requirements. Under that
approach, veteran friendliness helps claimants complete the process
even though their submissions are imperfect. In contrast, Judge
Newman’s view focuses on the intent of the claimant. In that view,
veteran friendliness requires front-line adjudicators to analyze clearly
defective submissions and respond with guidance as to how the
claimant might achieve his or her apparent goal. Obviously, the lawcentric and claimant-centric views of how lay adjudicators should
behave in an informal system sometimes produce different outcomes.
However, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence
consistently chooses one view over the other.
2.

Substantive Appeal
Rivera v. Shinseki,272 an example of a more claimant-centric view of
the system, contrasts nicely with Hargrove. Rivera dealt with the
requirement that a claimant must file a Substantive Appeal to perfect
an appeal to the BVA, as this requirement existed prior to the passage
of the VJRA.273 Then, as now, Title 38 required an appellant to “set
out specific allegations of error of fact or law, such allegations
[being] related to specific items in the statement of the case,” and
gave the BVA the discretion to “dismiss any appeal which fail[ed] to
allege specific error of fact or law in the determination being
appealed.”274 In addition, prior to the VJRA, the law contained a
presumption that “[t]he appellant will . . . [agree] with any statement
of fact contained in the statement of the case to which no exception
is taken.”275
In 1979, the veteran in Rivera sought to reopen a previously denied
claim, but VA denied the request because the evidence submitted was
merely cumulative.276 The veteran filed a NOD, the VA issued a SOC,
and eventually the veteran sent a letter asking about the status of his
appeal.277 VA instructed the veteran to file a Substantive Appeal, but
he replied that he had already filed one and asked the RO to search

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. (quoting Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1379–80.
38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(d)(3), (5) (2006).
Id. § 4005(d)(4).
Rivera, 654 F.3d at 1378.
Id.
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for it.278 The RO replied that it did not have one on file and
informed him that he needed to submit a Substantive Appeal within
thirty days or no further action would be taken.279 The veteran did
not respond to that letter.280 Fourteen years later, the veteran
reopened his claim again and prevailed.281 He then disputed the
effective date assigned on the basis that his 1979 claim had been
pending until his present claim was granted.282
In a lengthy en banc opinion, a majority of the CAVC determined
that the veteran’s 1979 claim was not pending.283 The essential issue
was whether the letter insisting that a Substantive Appeal had already
been filed could, by itself, qualify as a Substantive Appeal.284 The
majority concluded that it could not for a number of reasons.285 The
majority noted that the Substantive Appeal requirement was added in
1962 and explained that
[t]he act required VA for the first time to fully explain its decisions
through a new procedure called the Statement of the Case.
However, the act balanced this new disclosure rule with a
requirement that claimants respond to the SOC with a Substantive
Appeal that must clearly identify the benefits sought and should set
out specific allegations of error of fact or law . . . related to specific
items in the [S]tatement of the [C]ase.286

As a result, the CAVC determined that, “[b]ased on the language,
history, and complete structure of the statute creating the Substantive
Appeal procedure,” the statute was to be “interpreted as placing a
burden on claimants to expand upon their initial disagreement with
the RO decision by setting forth—however inartfully—a particular
theory of error for the Board to decide.”287 In so holding, the
veterans court noted that the Federal Circuit described the
Substantive Appeal requirement in Collaro v. West288 by explaining
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. For a detailed discussion of the pending claim doctrine, see John Fussell
& Jonathan Hager, The Evolution of the Pending Claim Doctrine, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 145
(2010).
283. Ortiz v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 353 (2010) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Rivera v.
Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The veteran died during the pendency of
the case; therefore, the Federal Circuit case is captioned with his widow’s name.
Rivera, 654 F.3d at 1379.
284. Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 359.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 357 (quoting Pub. L. No. 87-666, § 1, 76 Stat. 553, 553–54 (1962))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
287. Id.
288. 136 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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“that the ‘statutory and regulatory regime that Congress created to
protect veterans’ allows a claimant to file a ‘vague NOD’ and at a later
time ‘cut the rough stone of his NOD to reveal the radix of his issue
that lay within.’”289
In more general terms, the majority opinion explained its
reasoning: “Fundamentally, a liberal reading is a relative concept. It
does not eliminate the relevant procedural requirement. However, it
does require VA to be generous in interpreting a submission in light
of what the Secretary needs from the claimant to continue the
process.”290 The court concluded that the information required to
process a Substantive Appeal falls in between that of a NOD, which
requires only the basic intent to dispute a decision, and that of a
clear-and-unmistakable-error motion, which requires a specific error
and an explanation of how the outcome of the decision would have
been different.291 The majority also buttressed this part of its
discussion by observing that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Robinson
v. Shinseki292 cited the requirements of a valid Substantive Appeal in
support of the proposition that the veteran-friendly nature of the
system does not “entirely relieve[]” veterans of the “obligation to
raise issues in the first instance before the VA.”293
In applying its reasoning, the majority noted that it was clear that
the veteran was dissatisfied with the decisions, but that “mere
dissatisfaction is the essence of an NOD.”294 Therefore, “[i]n the
absence of an identifiable error for the Board to address, [the
veterans court could not] conclude that this correspondence
satisfie[d] the requirements of a Substantive Appeal.”295
The CAVC opinion provoked two dissenting opinions. First, Judge
Kasold, joined by Chief Judge Greene, asserted that the appellant was
not required to set forth any allegations of error because the statutory
term “should” does not mean the same as the term “must.”296 Judge
Kasold noted that such a reading is not always required and argued
that an interpretation more favorable to veterans was required under
Gardner.297 Judge Kasold’s dissent also argued that a liberal reading of
the veteran’s correspondence, asserting that he had already filed a

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 357 (quoting Collaro, 136 F.3d at 1308–09).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 358–59.
557 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1361.
Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 360.
Id.
Id. at 363 (Kasold, J., dissenting).
Id. at 364.
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Substantive Appeal, allowed the court to perceive that the
requirement was satisfied because there was only one issue that the
veteran could have been disputing: the determination that he had
not submitted new and material evidence.298 Second, Chief Judge
Greene filed a separate dissent arguing that, regardless of the
adequacy of the submission, the 1979 claim remained pending
because VA had not followed proper procedure, as it had not
forwarded the matter to the BVA for a final decision on the
timeliness question.299
The CAVC majority rejected Judge Kasold’s liberal-reading
argument, noting that
there are any number of possible errors that could be alleged. For
example, the appellant could have asserted that the RO failed to
address a particular piece of evidence in the record, that the RO
erred in its interpretation of the new evidence it discussed, that the
original decision was never final, or that some aspect of the
substantive law was misapplied. Accordingly, the fact that the
Board could identify the claim does not demonstrate that it could
identify any particular substantive, procedural, developmental, or
notice error.300

The majority also rejected Chief Judge Greene’s argument in a
footnote, noting that the timeliness dispute was separate from the
underlying merits, so any delay in ruling on it did not keep the
original claim alive.301
In a panel opinion authored by Judge Bryson, the Federal Circuit
reversed the CAVC’s opinion.302 The analysis began by noting that
the familiar principle that a veteran’s submissions must be read
sympathetically existed even prior to the VJRA.303 The court then
characterized the CAVC’s holding as “requir[ing] an appellant to
present ‘a particular theory of error for the Board to decide’ and to
‘explain why the [Statement of the Case] was in error,’”304 before it
shifted to the heart of its analysis.
Most of the Federal Circuit opinion was devoted to discussing how
the CAVC opinion was flawed in substantial part because it misread

298. Id.
299. Id. at 366 (Greene, C.J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 360 (majority opinion).
301. Id. at 362 n.2.
302. Rivera v. Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
303. Id. at 1380 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 19.116 (1980)).
304. Id. (quoting Ortiz, 23 Vet. App. at 357, 362). The quotation in the Federal
Circuit’s opinion notably omitted the “however inartfully” language that the CAVC
used in the sentence from which the first part of the quote was taken.
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the legislative history of the Substantive Appeal provision.305 The
Federal Circuit’s decision observed that “the requirement that
claimants set out specific allegations of error in their substantive
appeals was not adopted to balance the agency’s obligation to issue a
statement of the case, but was of much earlier vintage.”306 The court
explained that the original executive order establishing the BVA in
1933 had language similar to the current substantive appeal
requirement.307 “Accordingly, before 1962, veterans were required to
identify specific errors of fact or law for the Board to review, even
though they did not have the benefit of the agency’s statement of the
case explaining the reason for the regional office’s decision.”308
Judge Bryson’s opinion then presented a different view of the
purpose of the Substantive Appeal requirement. He noted that
multiple claims are often decided together, and that specificity in an
appeal is important in such a circumstance.309 In contrast, “less
specificity is necessary when the regional office’s decision turns on
only a single issue and the nature of the claimed error with respect to
that issue is obvious from the decision itself.”310 In Judge Bryson’s
view, “when the regional office decides only one issue and references
only one issue in the statement of the case, the veteran’s expression
of a desire to appeal from the regional office’s decision effectively
identifies the issue to be decided by the Board.”311 Thus, the Federal
Circuit sided with Judge Kasold’s dissent in the CAVC’s consideration
of the case.
Perhaps the most notable part of Rivera is how it engaged only with
specific parts of the CAVC opinion and did not discuss key aspects of
the government’s argument on appeal. The government’s argument
emphasized both the pre-VJRA presumption that an appellant agrees
with any factual finding that was not specifically disputed and the
Secretary’s interpretation of the disputed language as set forth in the
implementing regulations.312 However, the court did not even
address these issues. Furthermore, the opinion also did not discuss
the portions of Collero and Robinson cited by the CAVC. This focus on
the CAVC’s opinion rather than the arguments presented is quite

305. Id. at 1380–81.
306. Id. at 1380.
307. Id. at 1380–81 (citing Exec. Order No. 6230, pt. 2, § 1 (1933)).
308. Id. at 1381.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 22–27, Rivera, 654 F.3d 1377 (No. 06-932),
2011 WL 882039, at *23–27.
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different from the final two opinions that will be discussed.
3.

Board decision
Once an appeal is perfected and decided by the BVA, it may be
appealed to the CAVC. However, the BVA routinely addresses a wide
variety of topics and remands some, but not all, of the matters
addressed. When this occurs, it is not always clear how much of the
BVA decision is final and therefore immediately appealable to the
CAVC.
In Tyrues v. Shinseki,313 the Federal Circuit, in a decision by Chief
Judge Rader, rejected the argument that the finality of a BVA
decision can be indeterminate and subject to the claimant’s
discretion as to whether to appeal.314 Mr. Tyrues served in the
Persian Gulf War.315 Three years later, he developed tonsillitis and
pneumonia.316 In 1995, he applied for compensation benefits under
38 U.S.C. § 1110; in 1996, he applied for compensation for Persian
Gulf Syndrome under 38 U.S.C. § 1117.317 The two matters were
handled together, and the BVA denied direct compensation and
remanded the question of Persian Gulf Syndrome in 1998.318 The
BVA again denied Mr. Tyrues’s Persian Gulf claim, and the BVA
affirmed the denial in 2004.319
On appeal to the CAVC, Mr. Tyrues tried to raise arguments
relying on § 1110. In a sharply divided opinion, the en banc CAVC
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear those arguments.320 Six
of the seven judges agreed that the two theories of compensation
were part of the same claim because they pertained to the same
disability.321 That majority split, however, on the issue of how to
313. 631 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.).
314. Id. at 1383.
315. Id. at 1381.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1382.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 166, 168 (2009) (en banc), aff’d, 631 F.3d
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.).
321. The CAVC previously held that the scope of the claim is not limited to the
theory originally advanced by the lay claimant:
For purposes of the claim and its adjudication, it matters little that the
appellant believes his symptoms should be diagnosed as [one condition] if
the medical evidence establishes that his symptoms are actually something
different. And, the fact that the appellant may be wrong about the nature of
his condition does not relieve the Secretary of his duty to properly adjudicate
the claim.
Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 6 (2009) (per curiam); see also Ingram v.
Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 256–57 (2007) (per curiam) (“[I]t is the Secretary who
knows the provisions of title 38 and can evaluate whether there is potential under the
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interpret the CAVC’s jurisdiction in the frequently-occurring cases in
which the BVA issues a decision denying one theory within a claim,
but remanding another.322 The CAVC majority held that, in such a
situation, the denied theory must be appealed immediately.323 The
majority reasoned that requiring an immediate appeal would provide
claimants with prompt review, and that such decisions provide
claimants with reasonable notice that the denied theory must be
immediately appealed.324
The dissenting judges disputed the
argument that all claimants would reasonably understand the need to
immediately appeal one aspect of a claim when another aspect was
being remanded for further proceedings.325 The dissent also argued
that the theory-based rule of finality could not be workably applied to
many of the procedural provisions in Title 38 that speak in terms of
claims.326
The Federal Circuit’s opinion is somewhat confusing. Although
the central dispute at the CAVC was how to handle a single claim that
had been bifurcated, in exploring the facts, the Federal Circuit
opinion described the situation as involving two separate claims.327
This may have had something to do with the fact that Mr. Tyrues did
not side with any of the competing opinions in the CAVC’s opinion.
Instead, he argued that the veteran had the discretion either to
appeal a denial in a “mixed decision” immediately or wait until the
remanded portion is resolved.328
Chief Judge Rader’s opinion for the Federal Circuit rejected the
appellant’s argument. It relied heavily on Elkins v. Gober329 in holding
that “[s]eparate claims are separately appealable.”330 As to the critical
issue of timing, the opinion emphasized that “[p]ublic policy
supports allowing veterans to appeal denied claims as quickly as
law to compensate an averred disability based on a sympathetic reading of the
material in a pro se submission.”).
322. Tyrues, 23 Vet. App. at 178–79.
323. Id. at 179, 181.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 194 (Lance, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 195 (“[T]he majority opinion fails to address any of these [procedural]
issues, [and] it puts the Court on course to simply mark out every instance of the
word ‘claim’ in title 38 and pencil in ‘theory’ in order to make the statute
functional.”).
327. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 631 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75
(2011) (mem.).
328. Id. at 1383. The misstatement of the posture of the case may be related to
the phrasing of the appellant’s brief, which is phrased throughout in terms of the
CAVC’s jurisdiction over “mixed decision” claims. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 9,
15, 18, 24, Tyrues, 631 F.3d 1380 (No. 04-584), 2010 WL 617385, at *9, *15, *18, *24.
329. 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
330. Tyrues, 631 F.3d at 1383.
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possible.”331 It then reasoned that “this paramount goal is best
achieved by allowing appeals once the Board makes an individual
claim final.”332 Accordingly, the opinion concluded that “all final
decisions, even those appearing as part of a mixed decision, must be
appealed within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the
decision.”333
Notably, the opinion did not wade into the practical and
interpretive disagreements that divided the CAVC below. Instead,
the opinion commented that the Federal Circuit “encourages the
Veterans Court to exercise its jurisdiction as needed to promote
judicial efficiency and fairness when handling mixed decisions.”334
The Federal Circuit will have a second opportunity to address the
case, however, and perhaps wade into the issues that divided the
court below. This term, the Supreme Court, in light of Henderson v.
Shinseki,335 granted certiorari in Tyrues, vacated the opinion, and
remanded the case for reconsideration.336 In particular, the petition
for certiorari was filed by new counsel, who framed the issue as it had
been by the CAVC: “[W]hether the time limit in Section 7266(a)
requires the filing of an appeal when only one of two theories of
entitlement had been finally adjudicated, or whether the veteran has
the discretion to defer an appeal until all theories of entitlement have
been finally decided.”337 This case is certainly worth keeping an eye
on in 2012.
4.

Severance of benefits
The final veterans law case of 2011 was also a procedural case and a
split, en banc decision by the CAVC. In Roberts v. Shinseki,338 the
CAVC was divided in its determination of the procedures that VA
must follow in severing an award of service connection that has been
in effect for more than ten years.339 Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1159, a

331. Id. at 1384.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1385.
334. Id. at 1384.
335. 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
336. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 132 S. Ct. 75 (2011) (mem.).
337. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tyrues, 132 S. Ct. 75 (No. 10-1405), 2011
WL 1853076, at *i.
338. 23 Vet. App. 416 (2010) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 647 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
339. Compare id. at 425 (finding that severance based on fraud was an exception to
normal substantive due process procedures), with id. at 439 (Hagel, J. , concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that a finding of fraud alone should not
deprive a veteran of certain due process protections).
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grant of service connection that is greater than ten years old may not
be severed “except upon a showing that the original grant of service
connection was based on fraud.”340 The implementing regulation
states in part that “[t]he 10-year period will be computed from the
effective date of the Department of Veterans Affairs finding of service
connection to the effective date of the rating decision severing service
connection, after compliance with section 3.105(d).”341 In turn,
section 3.105(d), which is not specific to protected ratings, provides
that “[s]ubject to the limitations contained in . . . [section] 3.957,
service connection will be severed only where evidence establishes
that it is clearly and unmistakably erroneous (the burden of proof
being upon the Government).”342
The specific issue raised by the facts in Roberts was whether VA was
obligated to investigate and adjudicate alternative bases of
entitlement prior to severing benefits after determining that the basis
of the original award was fraudulent.343 The veteran in Roberts was
awarded service connection for PTSD based upon his alleged
presence at an accident where another service member was killed.344
A decade after the initial award of benefits, the veteran complained
to VA’s Office of the Inspector General that his claim was being
mishandled, but the investigation of the claim ultimately uncovered
copious evidence that the veteran was not actually present at the
accident upon which he based his claim.345 VA acted to sever his
benefits and referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, eventually resulting in the conviction of
the veteran on five counts of wire fraud.346
On appeal to the CAVC, the appellant argued that there was
evidence in the record suggesting that he could have been awarded
service connection for PTSD based upon an alternative stressor.347 In
the appellant’s view, section 3.105(d) required VA to show that the
340. 38 U.S.C. § 1159 (2006). The statute also allows for severance upon a
showing that the claimant “did not have the requisite service or character of
discharge.” Id.
341. 38 C.F.R. § 3.957 (2011).
342. Id. § 3.105(d).
343. Roberts v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1334, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en
banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
344. Id. at 1337.
345. Id. at 1337–38.
346. Id. at 1338–39.
347. Roberts v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 416, 441 (2010) (en banc) (Hagel, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 647 F.3d 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
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award was clearly and unmistakably erroneous after considering all
possible theories of entitlement.348 The majority of the CAVC
rejected the argument that section 3.105(d) had any application at
all, based upon the introductory sentence indicating that section
3.957 was an exception.349 The opinion went on to discuss the history
of two regulations in great detail as further support.350 Accordingly,
the court concluded that “the provisions of section 3.105 do not
apply to cases involving severance of service connection based upon
fraud.”351
Judge Hagel disputed the majority’s conclusion about the
applicability of section 3.105(d) and the scope of VA’s duties when
severing service connection, filing a dissenting opinion that was
joined by Judge Schoelen.352 The dissent responded to the majority’s
regulatory history with several pages of its own analysis,353 and also
disputed the majority’s interpretation of section 3.957.354 The dissent
concluded that the severance was improper and should be reversed
because the evidence was insufficient to show clearly and
unmistakably that the veteran was not entitled to service connection
for PTSD under any theory.355
The appellant also argued that the matter should not have been
adjudicated by VA, but should have been referred to an external
administrative law judge pursuant to the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act (PFCRA).356 However, the CAVC unanimously agreed
in one paragraph that the PFCRA did not apply because the amount
involved was greater than $150,000, which put the case outside the
reach of the Act.357
Finally, the CAVC concluded that the BVA erred in not addressing
the appellant’s entitlement to service connection for dysthymia and
depression independent of PTSD.358 This conclusion provoked a
dissent from Judge Lance, who argued that remand was unjustified
because the appellant never argued for a remand on that basis.359
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the CAVC’s
348. Id. at 424 (majority opinion).
349. Id. at 424–25.
350. Id. at 426–27.
351. Id. at 428.
352. Id. at 432 (Hagel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Id. at 432–39.
354. Id. at 439–40.
355. Id. at 440–49.
356. Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1934
(codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3801–12 (2006)).
357. Roberts, 23 Vet. App. at 424.
358. Id. at 430–31.
359. Id. at 450 (Lance, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decision in Judge O’Malley’s first precedential opinion on veterans
law. However, the focus of the Federal Circuit’s opinion was
substantially different. Initially, the opinion noted that “[the court]
express[ed] no opinion on those portions of the opinion that the
parties have not challenged on appeal. Specifically, [it] pass[ed] no
judgment on the Veterans Court’s holding that severance of benefits
based on fraud is not subject to a clear and unmistakable error
(CUE) analysis under 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(d).”360 Later, the court
explained that it would not address the portion of the decision that
resulted in Judge Lance’s dissent because the government was not
challenging it.361
Instead, the court focused most of its analysis on the PFCRA issue
that consumed only one paragraph of the thirty-four pages of
opinions below. Judge O’Malley’s opinion went into substantially
greater detail than the CAVC opinion, but reached the same
conclusion. It noted that the PFCRA is a “sister scheme” to the False
Claims Act, but that “[t]he legislative history of the PFCRA indicates
that it was intended to address ‘small-dollar cases’ of fraud against the
government because, in such cases, the ‘cost of litigation generally
exceeds the amount recovered, thus making it economically
impractical for the Justice Department to go to court.’”362
Accordingly, the Act has been expressly limited to claims involving
$150,000 or less.363 The opinion rejected the appellant’s argument
that the dollar amount was not a jurisdictional limit; it noted that the
case relied upon for that proposition involved an amount over
$150,000 only because the final award included additional penalties
and damages that had been added to the original amount of the
fraud.364
In addition to the jurisdictional limit addressed by both courts, the
Federal Circuit also held that the remedies provided by the PFCRA
were not exclusive, but rather were “in addition to any other remedy
that may be prescribed by law.”365 It rejected the argument that the
appellant was denied due process because the PFCRA’s procedures

360. Roberts v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1334, 1335 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g and reh’g en
banc denied, 647 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-603, 2012 WL 895974
(U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
361. Id. at 1338 n.3.
362. Id. at 1340 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-1012, at 257–59 (1986) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3868, 3902–04).
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1341 (discussing Orfanos v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 896 F.
Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1995)).
365. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3802(a)(1) (2006)).
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were not employed.366 It detailed the procedures followed by VA, and
found no justification for any conclusion that they do not satisfy
constitutional requirements.367
The opinion concluded with a short discussion of the appellant’s
argument that the BVA was obligated to consider other potential
stressors before severing his benefits for PTSD.368 After detailing the
BVA’s finding and quoting the CAVC’s conclusion on the issue, the
opinion simply stated: “We agree with the Veterans Court.”369
Roberts is notable for its similarity to Tyrues as opposed to Rivera. In
both Roberts and Tyrues, the Federal Circuit focused on the appellant’s
arguments and did not go beyond them to address the sharp divisions
within the CAVC that were expressed in lengthy and detailed
opinions. As the Tyrues court said little more than that it encouraged
the CAVC to promote fairness and efficiency,370 Roberts simply agreed
with the CAVC majority without elaboration.371 The Federal Circuit’s
restraint is not particularly surprising, but it does have implications
that are addressed further in the statistical addendum below.372
CONCLUSION
The tiny sample of cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2011 is
much too small upon which to draw any definitive conclusions on the
rules-versus-standards debate. Any preference that the Federal
Circuit may have would be relative at best, and the court disagreed
with the CAVC and the Secretary in only two cases in 2011, Bond and
Rivera.373 Even those two cases do not provide clear data. The choice
between rules and standards is not binary; rather the outcomes exist
on a spectrum, and it is not always obvious how best to classify a
ruling.
Bond appears to reject two different rules offered by the Secretary:
(1)that the veteran’s characterization of his submission is controlling;
366. Id. at 1343.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Tyrues v. Shinseki, 631 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 75
(2011) (mem.).
371. Roberts, 647 F.3d at 1343.
372. See infra notes 381–384 and accompanying text (tracking different judges’
participation in authored opinions).
373. Of course, Menegassi was affirmed on the grounds that the CAVC’s error was
not prejudicial. Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
However, the legal ruling offers little insight because it was based upon an explicit
example in the Federal Register and the Secretary conceded that the example given
during the promulgation of the regulation showed that the veteran’s interpretation
was accurate. See supra Part III.B (discussing Menegassi).
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and (2)that the BVA must be presumed to have determined that the
evidence was not new and material.374 However, it is not clear how
standard-like the court’s outcome is. The first ruling arguably favors
a fuzzier, holistic approach to interpreting a submission. The second
ruling, which requires the BVA to address the issue on remand,375
seems more rule-like, but feels less so when contrasted with Sickles,
which held that the BVA did not have to address an issue that was not
raised to it.376 Accordingly, Bond could be classified as a case in which
the court favored standards over rules in ruling against the Secretary.
Rivera fits less comfortably into this narrative. The CAVC’s ruling
was that a valid Substantive Appeal must set forth, “however inartfully,
a particular theory of error.”377 This standard is explicitly factual and
certainly fuzzy. However, the Federal Circuit’s rejection of this
standard may not be significantly more rule-like. The court held that
no specificity is required when a decision turns on only a single
issue.378 Although that holding sounds more rule-like, the meaning
of the word “issue” is not without ambiguity. The CAVC has noted
that words such as “issue,” “matter,” “claim,” and “theory” often have
been used imprecisely in veterans law, which has led to confusion in
practice.379 Thus, the fuzziness may have simply moved from
interpreting the veteran’s submission to interpreting the regional
office decision that is being disputed.
Using the alternative lenses still yields tantalizing results at best.
Under the Chevron-versus-Gardner perspective, both Bond and Rivera
favor sympathetically reading veteran’s submissions over granting
deference to the Secretary’s arguments as to how the system should
operate. In turn, both of these cases represent a triumph of the casespecific interpretation of veteran friendliness over that of the systemwide viewpoint. In the end, however, two cases are far too few to
make any definitive statements about the comparative preferences of
the Federal Circuit.
Nonetheless, with more data, these tools may well provide a
374. See supra notes 154–166 and accompanying text (examining the issues in
Bond).
375. Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
376. Sickels v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
377. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 311 and accompanying text (noting that when a single issue
has been decided by a regional office, a veteran’s appeal also conveys the nature of
the issue to be appealed).
379. See Hillyard v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 343, 355 (2011) (defining each term).
In particular, the CAVC’s decision in Hillyard noted that, “in Disabled American
Veterans v. Gober, the Federal Circuit equated the word ‘issue’ with a ‘claim’ and not a
theory or an element of a claim.” Id. (citing 234 F.3d 682, 694 (2000)). However, it
is not clear that Rivera was using the word “issue” to mean “claim.”
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valuable perspective in understanding the Federal Circuit’s approach
to veterans law. Moreover, they might be particularly useful in
following its evolution. As noted above in the Introduction, the
Federal Circuit is just embarking on a substantially new era and there
is certainly no guarantee that it would continue in the same direction
based upon any trends that might be discerned from its past cases.
Even if the court’s membership were to remain constant, it may be
argued that appellate courts naturally vacillate over time between
standard-like directives and rule-like legal commands when trying to
provide guidance to lower courts.380 Thus, the project of truly
comprehending the rules-versus-standards debate underlying
veterans law is much larger than a project to digest a year’s worth of
cases. Even so, this Article has begun the project and, hopefully, it
will eventually come to fruition.

380. See Scott Baker & Pauline T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice 17–18
(Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-01-04, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983446 (using game theory to argue for such a natural
vacillation).
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ADDENDUM
In last year’s annual survey of veterans law at the Federal Circuit,
Gugliuzza began a practice of providing a statistical addendum
consistent with those provided in other annual surveys of the court’s
jurisprudence.381
This Addendum continues that practice by
providing an empirical overview of the past year along with
cumulative charts that build upon the work done by Gugliuzza. To
the extent that these tables and graphs use the same format, the
detailed explanations of the data will not be repeated here. Of
course, as noted last year, there is a great deal of room for additional
data gathering and analysis.382
Table 1: Results of Precedential Veterans Opinions,
January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011383
Affirmed

Result

Number of Cases
9

Reversed

1

Vacated and remanded

1

Total

11

Table 1 summarizes the outcomes of the veterans law cases at the
Federal Circuit in terms of the court’s agreement with the CAVC.
The 81.8% affirmance rate (9 of 11) is even higher than the 78.6%
rate (11 of 14) in 2010.384 Of course, Menegassi was affirmed on the
grounds that the CAVC’s error was not prejudicial.385 Nonetheless,
even at 72.7% on the merits, in the realm of veterans law, the two
courts continue to have a relatively high rate of agreement. As
Gugliuzza noted last year, the general affirmance rate for regional
circuits reviewing district court or agency decisions is 62%.386
However, it should also be noted that the Federal Circuit reversed
and remanded three of the four EAJA decisions of the CAVC it
reviewed.387 This would bring the CAVC’s affirmance rate down to
381. See Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258 (explaining how this addendum
summarizes the Federal Circuit’s veterans opinions over the past decade).
382. Id.
383. This table does not include Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) decisions.
384. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258.
385.. Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
386 Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1258–59.
387. See Patrick v. Shinseki, 668 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing and
remanding to determine whether the government carried its burden of proving that
its position was substantially justified); Padgett v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 950 (Fed. Cir.
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66.7% (10 of 15). Even so, this would still be slightly above the
average affirmance rate for the regional circuit courts of appeal.
Table 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge,
January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011388

Judge

Number
Authored

Number on
Panel

Number of
Separate
Opinions

Percentage
Authored

Number
Authored
Generating
Separate
Opinions

Rader

1

4

25.0%

0

0

Newman

0

2

0.0%

1

0

Lourie

0

0

—

0

0

Bryson

2

3

66.7%

0

1

Linn

1

4

25.0%

0

0

Dyk

1

5

20.0%

1

0

Prost

2

3

66.7%

0

1

Moore

1

3

33.3%

0

1

O’Malley

2

3

66.7%

0

0

Reyna

0

0

—

0

0

Wallach

0

0

—

0

0

Mayer

0

0

—

0

0

Plager

0

2

0.0%

0

0

Clevenger

1

2

50.0%

0

0

Schall

0

0

—

0

0

Gajarsa

0

2

0.0%

1

0

Per
Curiam

0

0

—

0

0

Total

11

33

33.3%

3

3

Unlike last year, when Judges Dyk, Friedman, and Gajarsa authored
over half of the veterans law opinions of the court,389 the distribution
2011) (reversing a CAVC order denying a surviving spouse’s application for attorney
fees and expenses); Wagner v. Shinseki, 640 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding that
the CAVC incorrectly denied a veteran supplemental attorney fees incurred
defending his initial application for fees under EAJA).
388. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
389. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1260.
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this year was much more balanced. The eleven opinions were
authored by eight different judges, and no judge authored more than
two opinions. However, the distribution of judges participating in
veterans law panels was somewhat less even, and Judge Dyk, once
again, participated in more such panels than any other judge.390
Rather than looking at 2011 in isolation, though, combining this
year’s data with that already collected from the previous year provides
a fuller picture, as shown below in Table 3.

390. Id.
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Table 3: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Judge,
January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011391

Judge

Number
Authored

Number on
Panel

Number of
Separate
Opinions

Percentage
Authored

Number
Authored
Generating
Separate
Opinions

Rader

1

7

14.3%

0

0

Newman

0

7

0.0%

3

0

Lourie

0

1

0.0%

0

0

Michel

0

0

—

0

0

Bryson

3

10

30.0%

0

1

Linn

1

4

25.0%

0

0

Dyk

5

11

45.5%

1

0

Prost

2

7

28.6%

0

1

Moore

2

7

28.6%

0

1

O’Malley

2

3

66.7%

0

0

Reyna

0

0

—

0

0

Wallach

0

0

—

0

0

Mayer

1

3

33.3%

0

0

Plager

1

3

33.3%

0

0

Clevenger

1

3

33.3%

0

0

Schall

0

0

—

0

0

Gajarsa

2

5

40%

1

0

Per
Curiam

1

—

—

0

1

Total

25

72

—

5

5

The aggregate numbers confirm the trends that Gugliuzza
observed last year. Despite the fact that judges are assigned to panels
at random, there is a substantial disparity in the number of published
veterans law opinions in which the different judges are involved. As
mentioned above, Judge Dyk (11 cases) continues to be the most
likely to be on a panel that decides to publish an opinion. He has
also authored more than twice as many opinions (5) as any other
391. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
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judge except Judge Bryson (3). Accordingly, an additional year of
data continues to support the hypothesis that he is the judge most
active in shaping veterans law at the Federal Circuit, and is consistent
with other data cited by Gugliuzza that Judge Dyk is generally more
inclined to push for publication of opinions with which he is
involved.392
However, the other judges are not uniform in their participation.
Judge Dyk’s eleven precedential panels are followed closely by Judge
Bryson’s ten. Judge Bryson is also the only other judge to author
greater than two opinions. Therefore, he also appears to be a judge
to watch in the area. Notably, Judge O’Malley was involved in three
published panel opinions in her first year on the court and authored
two of those opinions. Accordingly, it will be interesting to see if her
level of activity will trend toward that of Judges Dyk and Bryson, or
will fall more in line with the remainder of the court.
Finally, the aggregate data continues to support the observation
that Judge Newman is the most likely to write separately. After two
years, she has authored more than half the separate opinions in the
area of veterans law (3 of 5), and each separate opinion has been
attached to a different majority author. No other judge has authored
more than one separate opinion. Finally, no judge has authored
more than one majority opinion that resulted in a concurring or
dissenting opinion.

392. Gugliuzza, supra note 1, at 1260 (citing Gregory A. Castanias, Lawrence D.
Rosenberg, Michael S. Fried & Todd R. Geremia, Survey of the Federal Circuit’s Patent
Law Decisions in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme Court, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 793, 977 (2007)).
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Table 4: Precedential Veterans Opinions by Type of CAVC Decision and
Appellant, January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2011393
Type of CAVC
Opinion

Number of Cases

Appealing Party
(Veteran/ Secretary)

Result
(Affirmed/Not Affirmed)

En Banc

3

3/0

2/1

Panel

1

1/0

1/0

394

Single Judge

7

7/0

6395/1

Total

11

11/0

9/2

These statistics were not gathered or examined by Gugliuzza, but
they are worth exploring. The Federal Circuit’s review of the CAVC
is the only situation in the federal system, aside from Supreme Court
review, in which one appellate court conducts direct review of the
decisions of another.396 As Michael Allen has pointed out, the
different types of decisions issued by the CAVC—single-judge, panel,
and en banc—serve different purposes. Single-judge decisions are
used primarily for error correction, whereas panel and en banc
decisions tend to serve the role of law giving.397 Of course, the
published opinions of the Federal Circuit also serve the role of law
giving. Therefore, it is worth considering the correspondence
between the courts in the types of review they provide.
Initially, it is noteworthy that nearly two-thirds (7 of 11) of the
published opinions in veterans law cases at the Federal Circuit were
in cases that were decided by a single judge below. Furthermore, in
only one of those cases did the Federal Circuit’s opinion indicate that
the single-judge decision was clearly bound by a panel opinion of the
CAVC and that the Federal Circuit would, therefore, review the
relevant CAVC panel decision. Accordingly, it would seem from this
small sample that the Federal Circuit tends to make law most
frequently when reviewing CAVC decisions that were not intended to
make law.398 On the one hand, it is not surprising given the volume
393. This table does not include EAJA decisions.
394. This includes Guerra, which expressly relied upon Bradley. See supra note 197
and accompanying text.
395. This includes Menegassi, which affirmed on the basis of harmless error. See
supra notes 147–151 and accompanying text.
396. Eaton, supra note 1, at 1161.
397. See Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) and
What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 514–18 (2007) (suggesting
that the CAVC should reconsider its single-judge procedures in order to strike a
better balance between law-giving and error correction).
398. The CAVC’s criteria for deciding a case by a single judge are set forth in
Frankel v. Derwinski, and include a requirement that such a case may not establish a
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of cases decided by a single judge at the CAVC.399 On the other
hand, it seems somewhat curious that only a single Federal Circuit
opinion stems from direct review of a CAVC panel decision.400
Whether this small sample is representative and whether it has any
important implications are beyond the scope of this Article, but it is a
trend worth following.
Another specific trend that merits further examination is the
Federal Circuit’s treatment of en banc CAVC decisions. The CAVC
decided four cases en banc in 2009 and 2010 combined. In 2011, the
Federal Circuit issued published opinions in three of those cases, and
the fourth remains pending after oral argument in October.401 This
indicates that an en banc opinion by the CAVC is a strong predictor
that the Federal Circuit will review it and publish an opinion.402
At first blush, this is an obvious correlation to expect. It is easy to
understand that the issues that the CAVC finds so momentous as to
merit an en banc opinion would tend to be important enough for the
Federal Circuit to address in published opinions. Indeed, William F.
Fox has observed that the Federal Circuit can leave veterans law in a
state of uncertainty when it casts doubt on portions of en banc CAVC
decisions that it does not directly address.403 However, the three
Federal Circuit opinions in 2011 reviewing en banc CAVC opinions
undermined the hypothesis that prompt rulings by the Federal
Circuit help to resolve the issues that divide the CAVC. As discussed
above, those Federal Circuit opinions focused on the arguments
raised by counsel with no real discussion of the CAVC opinions, while
a third addressed only a portion of the authorities relied upon by the
CAVC. Accordingly, these issues remain open for dispute and will
likely be raised in future cases.404 Whether these issues will reemerge
new rule of law. 1 Vet. App. 23, 25 (1990).
399. See James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of
Appellate Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L.
REV. 113, 151–57 (2009) (noting that the CAVC logged 614 single-judge decisions
after the first twenty-one weeks of 2008).
400. This is not to say that the low number must stem from the Federal Circuit’s
choices about what opinions to publish. It may be that these opinions simply are not
being directly appealed for some reason.
401. Chandler v. Shinseki, No. 2011-7030 (argued Oct. 4, 2011) (reviewing
Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23 (2010) (en banc)).
402. As discussed above, all of the en banc CAVC opinions were divided, with at
least two judges on each dissenting. Therefore, there is no data on whether a
unanimous en banc opinion by the CAVC is as likely to produce a published opinion.
403. See WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE LAW OF VETERANS BENEFITS:
JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION 222–23 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing how Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d
1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997), sub silentio, called into question CAVC’s en banc decision in
West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 329 (1995) (en banc)).
404. See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572,
1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“When an issue is not argued or is ignored in a decision, such
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at the Federal Circuit in the future and, if so, how the court will react,
are both questions worth watching for in the future.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the claimant was the appellant
in all eleven cases that the Federal Circuit decided by precedential
opinion in 2011. Although VA is not permitted to appeal BVA
decisions to the CAVC,405 it may appeal adverse CAVC decisions to
the Federal Circuit.406 Indeed, claimants prevail in a substantial
majority of cases decided by the CAVC,407 but it appears that it is the
claimants who lose the minority of cases at the CAVC who actually
dominate veterans law at the Federal Circuit.
It is not surprising that appeals by the Secretary would be relatively
rare. VA is certainly a sophisticated party that must understand the
jurisdictional limitations of the Federal Circuit. Accordingly, it is to
be expected that appeals by the Secretary would be less frequent. Yet,
it would also be expected that when the Secretary does appeal a
CAVC decision, it would raise a substantial legal question that merits
a published opinion. Thus, it is interesting that not a single
published opinion in 2011 was based upon an appeal by the
Secretary.
This also raises some interesting institutional issues for the Federal
Circuit. CAVC appeals are overwhelmingly resolved in favor of
claimants,408 but the Federal Circuit sees only cases in which the
CAVC ruled for VA; as a result, does that present the Federal Circuit
a skewed perspective on the system?409 As the Federal Circuit’s
veterans law docket is almost exclusively appeals by appellants, does
that tend to convert the court into a one-way ratchet, similar to the
decision is not precedent to be followed in a subsequent case in which the issue
arises.”); see also Boggs v. West, 188 F.3d 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
National Cable Television Ass’n in the context of a veterans law case).
405. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006).
406. Id. § 7292(a).
407. See Ridgway, supra note 399, at 154 (finding that the CAVC fully affirmed less
than thirty-five percent of BVA decisions it considered).
408. It is also worth noting that the denials seen by the CAVC are not
representative of the system as a whole, which grants at least some benefit to 88% of
applicants. See Ridgway, supra note 72, at 266 (explaining how VA grants this
percentage of claims for disability compensation for at least one disabling
condition).
409. A similar selection issue occurs in criminal law, where double jeopardy
prevents the government from appealing cases where the defendant was acquitted.
See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Double Jeopardy’s Asymmetric Appeal Rights: What
Purpose Do They Serve?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2002) (arguing that limiting the
ability of the government to appeal acquittals on double jeopardy grounds creates
incentives that cause systemic problems that may lead to more false convictions). But
see Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in Criminal Cases: The Myth of Asymmetery,
77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2008) (arguing the problems caused by asymmetric
appellate access are overblown).
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CAVC?410 Further attention to such structural issues underlying
appeals from the CAVC to the Federal Circuit may prove a fruitful
avenue of research.
Figure 1: Precedential Opinions Reviewing the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, 2000 to 2011411
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Figure 1 shows that the number of precedential veterans law
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit continues to be at an ebb.
Even adding the four EAJA opinions to the substantive veterans law
cases still leaves 2011 near the bottom and below the average for the
period.

410. See Ridgway, supra note 72, at 257 (noting that the CAVC has the power to
affirm the status quo or move the system in favor of veterans, but cannot move the
system in favor of the Secretary because the Secretary cannot appeal to argue that the
BVA erred in the veteran’s favor).
411. This table includes EAJA decisions. EAJA decisions are included in this data
because EAJA decisions are included in the data from earlier years and in the
comparative data.
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Figure 2: Precedential Veterans Opinions Compared to Total Number of
Dispositions by Judges Reviewing the CAVC, 2006 to 2011412
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Figure 2 compares the precedential opinions reviewing decisions of
the CAVC to the total number of appeals from the CAVC disposed of
by judges of the Federal Circuit.413 Given that four of the published
opinions reviewing CAVC decisions addressed EAJA rather than
veterans law (as opposed to last year when there were none), 2011
represents the least productive year for veterans law opinions for
some time. Last year’s relatively low production corresponded with a
low output overall, as did the total of 13 decisions in 2006. However,
it appears that even though the number of appeals from the CAVC
increased recently, that has not translated into a corresponding
increase in published veterans law opinions. Whether the numbers
will increase in 2012, only time will tell.

412. This table includes EAJA decisions. EAJA decisions are included in this data
because EAJA decisions are included in the data from earlier years and in the
comparative data.
413. This methodology is different from Gugliuzza’s addendum last year, which
compared the total number of precedential opinions to the total number of merits
decisions in CAVC appeals for the corresponding fiscal year. See Gugliuzza, supra
note 1, at 1262 (depicting a chart containing both precedential opinions and total
merits adjudications from 2006 to 2010). This is because the Federal Circuit has
changed the data available on its website and now reports the total number of
terminations by judges, apparently regardless of whether the termination was
jurisdictional or on the merits. Statistics, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (click appropriate
pdfs under “Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending” heading) (last visited Mar. 19,
2012). The totals reflect a similar trend, but are substantially higher because of the
substantial number of appeals from the CAVC that are dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds due to the nature of the argument presented.

